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Pricing Strategy for Cloud Computing Services 
 
HUANG JIANHUI 
 
Abstract 
The cloud computing services market exhibits unique characteristics such as in-
stant accessibility, fluctuating demand and supply, and interruptible service provision. 
Various pricing mechanisms exist in current industry practice. None of these pricing 
mechanisms, however, is comprehensive enough to capture all these features in a way 
that allows the vendors to optimize resource allocation. This dissertation identifies 
key factors related to cloud computing pricing, and examines their interplays.  
This research uses multiple approaches, including a market survey, game theory 
modeling, simulation, lab experiments and econometric modeling, to analyze the pric-
ing strategy of cloud services vendors. A field study of a representative set of cloud 
vendors’ pricing approaches provides background information to motivate this disser-
tation. Important factors in current cloud pricing practice are highlighted. This part of 
the work offers an overview of how cloud computing services are priced and how the 
pricing approaches have evolved over time. This is important for identifying the 
causes of confusion among clients regarding the pricing of cloud computing services, 
especially when new pricing methods emerge. 
 
 
 
 
The following study reports on an analytical model and simulations to derive op-
timal pricing strategies for a monopoly cloud services vendor that operates in the re-
served and spot-price services market. Although interruptible spot services potentially 
cause undesired consequences for clients, the cloud services vendor can improve its 
profit by offering low quality interruptible spot-price services, together with high 
quality fixed-price reserved services. 
The last study examines clients’ willingness-to-pay for brokered cloud services 
offered with a hybrid pricing mechanism in the presence of fixed-price reserved and 
spot-price on-demand services through behavioral experiments. This study yields two 
findings. First, subjects’ willingness-to-pay is affected by their informedness of the 
service interruption risk associated with spot-price on-demand services. Second, this 
effect is moderated by their aversion to risk.  
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1  Introduction 
There are the controversial viewpoints on what is cloud computing. Detailed dis-
cussions on this issue can be found in Vaquero et al. (2009) and Madhavaiah et al. 
(2012). Cloud computing provides highly-scalable IT services to clients with instant 
access via the Internet (Armbrust et al. 2010) while offering enterprise clients busi-
ness agility and cost efficiency. Economies of scale, which drive down the cost of 
services provision and raise vendor profit, make cloud computing services financially 
attractive and the cloud business sustainable (Armbrust et al. 2010, Foster et al. 2010, 
Marston 2011, Bardhan et al. 2010). Cloud computing services are transforming en-
terprise IT provision and gaining popularity. According to Gartner (2012, 2013), rev-
enue in the global cloud computing services market was US$111 billion in 2012, rep-
resenting a 21.4% increase from US$91.4 billion in 2011, and it will reach US$206.6 
billion in 2016.  
Cloud computing services appeal to clients with an unknown or changing demand 
for computing power and large batch processing tasks (Armbrust et al. 2010). As 
prices are constantly being driven down (Stevens 2012, Heath 2013), in the long run, 
it is likely that clients will rely on cloud computing for all IT-related services. This is 
because it is more economical than in-house systems, especially for clients who main-
ly execute data-intensive computing tasks, where the cost savings can be up to 95% 
(Kondo et al. 2009). This will have a great impact on businesses as reducing cost and 
increasing profit are major concerns. We have already seen cloud computing services 
playing revolutionary roles in several industries. The cost reduction of cloud compu-
ting services has had a dramatic impact on the software industry that is similar to the 
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impact of semiconductor manufacturing on the hardware industry (Armbrust et al. 
2009). It has created significant opportunities for IT startups with limited initial capi-
tal to invest (Etro 2009). Music, movies, and television series are all now offered via 
online streaming services, backed by cloud services, such as Netflix. In the healthcare 
industry, companies such as Practice Fusion, Microsoft, Qualcomm Life, Philips, 
Verizon and AT&T have launched cloud-based vertical solutions that support greater 
health data sharing and accessibility. This will greatly enhance the efficiency of col-
laboration between healthcare providers and ensure seamless, personalized healthcare 
services (Grindle et al. 2013). 
The idea of obtaining computing power on demand is not totally new though. It 
was first explored by researchers in the grid computing literature of the mid-1990s. 
They studied how to make the idle computer resources available all over the world to 
those in need of computing power, with information technologies that coordinate cli-
ents to discover, request, and use computer resources in an on-demand manner (Fos-
ter et al. 2008).  
Despite their similarities in vision, the grid and the cloud have crucial differences 
in their business models. There has been a surge of adoption of cloud computing ser-
vices in the past several years, which grid computing was not able to achieve after 
more than 15 years of development. In the grid computing business model, lack of 
control of underlying infrastructures forced vendors to face the uncertainty of re-
source availability and over-provisioning (Foster et al. 2010). This posed the problem 
of the coordinator being unable to deliver the required levels of quality of service 
(QoS) (Broberg et al. 2008, Buyya et al. 2007). In the cloud computing business 
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model though, a cloud services vendor has full control of its infrastructure, which re-
duces the uncertainty of resource availability and over-provisioning of services. In 
this respect, the dedication of computers to cloud services is pivotal to the success of 
the cloud business model. It releases the vendors from the concern of obtaining suffi-
cient computer resources, and enables them to focus on the design and pricing of the 
cloud services offerings in order to make sufficient profit.  
Although cloud computing has dedicated servers that support services provision, 
maintaining QoS and meeting service level agreements (SLAs) are still challenging. 
Cloud computing services are delivered via the Internet, which lacks a QoS guarantee 
mechanism. In addition, potential system and software failures that may shutdown the 
cloud platform are more difficult to detect in large-scale distributed systems like the 
cloud (Armbrust et al. 2010). In addition, demand uncertainty is also a challenge for 
cloud services vendors (Henzinger et al. 2010). Furthermore, heterogeneous perfor-
mance of virtual machines increases the difficulty of vendors in maintaining QoS and 
SLA (Mei et al. 2011, Jayasinghe et al. 2013, Ou et al. 2013, Pu et al. 2013). These 
challenges motivate researchers to study SLA-based resource-allocation mechanisms 
in cloud computing (Buyya et al. 2009, Benaroch et al. 2010, Wu et al. 2013, Zhao et 
al. 2013).  
One such example is the work by Sim (2010). The author proposed a complex ne-
gotiation mechanism for the cloud to enable dynamic SLA negotiation between: (1) a 
cloud broker and its clients; and (2) a cloud broker and other cloud services vendors. 
The market mechanism potentially improves the overall market efficiency as clients 
get tailored services. The dimensions of the negotiable SLAs, however, are not dis-
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cussed in a real business context. In addition, an understanding of how clients value 
flexibility in different aspects of cloud services provision—such as time of access, 
duration of use, computing capability required, and others—is important for the mar-
ket mechanism to be viable. The second part of this dissertation pursues insights into 
client characteristics. 
Besides grid computing, cloud computing also shares similarities and differences 
with several other products and services. Regarding the cost of providing services, 
cloud computing services have similar characteristics to information goods and tradi-
tional capacity-limited services, such as hotel room and airline ticket bookings. In-
formation goods require a large investment in the creation of the first copy, while the 
production and distribution costs for each additional copy are very small. Analogous-
ly, the marginal cost of providing a single unit of cloud computing services is also 
small, if not negligible, compared to the huge investment in building the infrastruc-
ture.  
The hotel and airline industries have to balance their operational capacity with 
fluctuations in demand. It is the same in the cloud computing services industry. On 
average, however, the frequency of repeated purchases of cloud services is far higher 
than that of hotel rooms or airline tickets: frequent travellers probably book hotel 
rooms and purchase airline tickets several times a month, while enterprise clients use 
cloud services every day. Furthermore, the duration of usage relative to the amount of 
billable time that is used is longer for cloud computing services than for hotel rooms, 
for example.  
Nevertheless, given their similarities, it is worthwhile to ground our understand-
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ing of cloud services in the literature related to information goods, the hotel industry, 
and the sale of airline tickets. Knowledge from research in those areas is useful. The 
lack of standardization of cloud services contracts and delivery requires clients to be 
knowledgeable though. Uncertain standards make it difficult for clients to compare 
different services and make purchase decisions. This also creates difficulties for in-
teroperation among different cloud services. 
In the market, initially there were three main types of cloud computing services: 
infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software as a ser-
vice (SaaS). As the cloud computing services market matured, more categories of ser-
vices have emerged, such as data storage as a service (DSaaS), hardware as a ser-
vice (HaaS), desktop as a service (DaaS), business process as a service (BPaaS), and 
many more (Rimal et al. 2009). Cloud services vendors have adopted a variety of 
pricing mechanisms, including usage-based fixed pricing, usage-based dynamic pric-
ing, subscription-based pricing, reserved services contracts with a combination of us-
age-based fixed pricing and up-front fees, and auction-based pricing.  
Among the various pricing mechanisms, usage-based pricing is one of the main 
selling points of cloud computing services. With usage-based pricing, clients pay the 
vendor on a consumption basis. This is like when utility companies charge clients for 
basic utilities such as electricity, water, and gas. Usage-based pricing has various 
forms. Usage-based fixed pricing is implemented by vendors, who charge by the hour, 
minute or second. Usage-based dynamic pricing is implemented differently. Some 
vendors let the price fluctuate while maintaining a level of service quality. Others 
may degrade service quality by restricting the service capability that a client can 
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choose, or by introducing an interruption mechanism through which the vendor can 
hold back resources without notifying its clients (Amazon 2013).  
One good example is Amazon. As an IaaS vendor, Amazon first introduced the 
Elastic Computing Cloud (EC2) in 2006 with usage pricing per instance-hour. After 
that, Amazon announced its EC2 reserved services and EC2 spot services in 2009. 
The EC2 reserved services require the client’s financial commitment in advance, 
while the EC2 spot services are implemented with an auction mechanism. This means 
that potential clients must bid for their desired resources and the price of the resources 
changes over time (Amazon 2013). The various pricing mechanisms Amazon imple-
mented for its cloud computing services creates difficulties for clients in estimation, 
comparison, and optimization of the cost to use Amazon.com’s cloud computing ser-
vices. Prior research has investigated this problem and suggested to formulate the 
cloud services consumption plan as a stochastic programming problem to achieve 
cost minimization (Chaisiri et al. 2012), or to use demand prediction techniques such 
as Kalman filter to enable adaptive purchasing of cloud computing services and min-
imize cost (Hwang et al. 2013). 
On the other hand, PaaS and SaaS vendors typically offer a package of IT services 
and choose prices similar to charging plans for mobile phones. Some PaaS vendors 
also implement pricing strategy similar to IaaS vendors. Their prices are different for 
different types of service instances, but the underlying mechanism is task-oriented.  
With cloud computing services, clients can access virtualized hardware or opera-
tion systems and software applications of all kinds via cloud computing platforms, 
with capital expenses that are much lower than before. In the traditional business 
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model of IT services, selling and licensing are major means of revenue for the ven-
dors. The pay-as-you-go business model thus puts considerable competitive pressure 
on traditional IT service vendors, including both hardware and software vendors such 
as IBM, Oracle, Hewlett-Packard and many others. Meanwhile, some traditional IT 
services vendors are also entering the cloud market. Some examples are Applications 
Cloud from Oracle, SmartCloud from IBM, and Windows Azure from Microsoft. 
In practice, various implementations of pricing for cloud services have caused 
some uncertainty among clients, diminishing their interest in adopting cloud compu-
ting services. This also may lead them to misalign their business goals with the cloud 
services they have adopted. Such misalignment creates the possibility that core busi-
ness functions are run on cloud computing services that are cost-effective to some 
extent but subject to unexpected service termination by vendors, such as Amazon 
EC2’s spot-price services. The consequences can be critical (Howard 2011).  
This dissertation seeks answers to why cloud vendors have adopted so many dif-
ferent pricing mechanisms, other than differentiate their services from those of other 
vendors (Choudhary 2010). What is the best strategy if a cloud vendor implements 
more than one type of pricing scheme?  
The large price reduction associated with interruptible cloud services offers the 
client incentives to bear the risk of unexpected services interruption. Statistical mod-
els of spot prices are used to predict the payment for jobs running as spot instances 
(Javadi et al 2011). Technologies, such as checkpointing, can be employed to reduce 
the impact of service interruption to an acceptable level (Yi et al. 2010, Yi et al. 
2013). These technologies, however, are yet to mature. Meanwhile, different parties 
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are entering the market to address this problem for clients. Emerging cloud brokerage 
services offer clients low-cost, immediate-restoration-upon-interruption cloud ser-
vices. The services are suitable for highly-parallel computing tasks of limited duration, 
but are unsuitable for tasks that require high availability. So far there has been no dis-
cussion about the value of services interruption mitigation technologies, which is crit-
ical for their commercialization. Neither have issues related to the economic impact 
of cloud brokerage been explored scientifically.  
Cloud services brokers usually build a software stack on top of their IaaS offer-
ings. They also charge clients in a similar way to major IaaS vendors. Is this a good 
practice for them though? Why would a cloud broker operate on one layer but not on 
other layers in the cloud computing services ecosystem? How will brokerage services 
affect existing cloud services and their vendors? 
Prices signal the quality of services. And a vendor’s pricing scheme directly af-
fects a client’s decision on whether to use the services. For both cloud services ven-
dors and brokers, identifying the common factors in cloud services pricing is critical, 
which is one of the key issues in this dissertation. By identifying the common factors 
in cloud services pricing, the findings will contribute to the improved implementation 
of cloud services. These common factors reflect client and vendor concerns about 
cloud services from different perspectives, including the financial perspectives of risk 
management and valuation.  
The goal of this research is to enhance the understanding of cloud computing ser-
vices pricing and its underlying economic mechanisms. Figure 1.1 gives an overview 
of the dissertation. 
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Figure 1.1 Research model 
  
This dissertation will include three parts. The first is a market survey with cases 
involving different cloud pricing approaches. It provides an overview of pricing prac-
tices in the cloud computing services market, and identifies important factors in cur-
rent cloud pricing mechanism designs. The second is developed with a cloud services 
vendor’s perspective, proposes a stylized analytical model to study the profitability of 
offering cloud services with multiple pricing methods by considering clients’ self-
selection behavior. The third conducts a behavioral experiment on a specially-
implemented online platform to examine variables that affect client willingness-to-
pay for brokered cloud services. It includes guaranteed job completion, and a hybrid 
pricing mechanism.  
The rich literature on pricing information goods (Maskin and Riley 1984, Varian 
1995, Sundarajan 2004, Masuda and Whang 2006, Png and Wang 2010) and revenue 
management (Boyd and Bilegan 1999, McGill and Van Ryzin 1999) provides a good 
starting point. This dissertation employs a number of research methodologies, includ-
ing a market survey, analytical modeling, simulation, experimental design, and econ-
  
Market Perspective 
Market survey of pricing practices 
  Analysis of different pricing 
mechanisms with standard 
cloud services 
Essay 1: Vendor’s Perspective 
  Investigation of clients’ will-
ingness-to-pay for brokered 
cloud service with a com-
pound pricing mechanism 
Essay 2: Client’s Perspective 
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ometric modeling to answer the following research questions:  
(1) What are the key factors that should be considered in pricing cloud computing 
services?  
(2) Should a cloud vendor be interested in multiple pricing approaches? Related to 
this, how should Amazon.com’s EC2 hybrid pricing strategy, with both fixed-
price reserve pricing and dynamic spot pricing, be evaluated?  
(3) What are the key variables that will affect clients’ valuation of cloud services? 
How will they affect clients’ willingness-to-pay for brokered cloud services 
with guaranteed job completion? 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 offers an overview 
of the pricing practices in the current cloud computing services market. Chapter 3 
presents the model of a monopoly cloud computing services vendor offering its ser-
vices with fixed pricing, spot pricing, or hybrid pricing that contains both. Chapter 4 
presents an experimental study of client willingness-to-pay for a brokered cloud com-
puting services with a job completion guarantee, in the presence of fixed pricing and 
spot pricing. Chapter 5 contains my reflections on the IRB permission process for this 
research. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation and discusses limitations and future 
research.  
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2  Pricing Practices in the Cloud Computing Services Market 
This chapter presents an overview of pricing practices in the cloud computing 
services market. Specifically, it discusses a wide range of cloud computing services 
and compared their pricing schemes to identify common factors that affect total price. 
I also describe several cases where a noticeable trend—of how cloud services vendors 
change their pricing decisions and services offerings—is observed. I also will summa-
rize the observations and discuss their implication for both research and practice. 
2.1  Background  
Cloud computing services vendors are employing a number of pricing mecha-
nisms, such as usage-based, subscription-based, and a hybrid mix of fixed and usage-
based pricing. Even within a specific type of pricing though, variation exists in the 
market. For example, subscription plans for cloud services can differ in multiple di-
mensions, including the length of the subscription period (monthly, quarterly, or year-
ly), the number of clients as system users, the number of hosted applications, and so 
on. It is interesting to see such diversity in pricing approaches in the marketplace. 
And there are conflicting viewpoints, in terms of cost, performance, compliance, and 
management, about whether cloud computing services are a better alternative to in-
house systems. 
Despite the significant marketing hype, the wide-spread adoption of cloud infra-
structure and services by organizations is yet to materialize. Comparison studies have 
been performed to evaluate the option of using the cloud versus its alternatives. This 
work has compared cloud services to desktop grids in scientific data-intensive appli-
cations (Kondo et al. 2009), cloud and community clusters in parallel MPI applica-
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tions (Walker 2008), and computational and storage costs for a montage application 
deployed in the cloud (Deelman et al. 2008). Cost and performance comparisons are 
the key concerns of the studies in this line of research. They also highlight the lack of 
clarity about the cost and performance of cloud computing services. Prior research 
has pointed out that the monetary cost of running scientific data-intensive applica-
tions using Amazon.com’s S3 data storage services is out of reach for some potential 
clients, because the storage services—including availability, durability, and access 
performance—can be expensive but not altogether necessary (Palankar et al. 2008). 
Contradictory results were presented by Deelman et al. (2008): with storage cost re-
ductions, using cloud services is cheaper than in-house systems for data-intensive ap-
plications. 
Many of the doubts are rooted in the fact that clients are unclear about the total 
cost of adopting cloud computing services (Durkee 2010). The complicated price 
structures are the key challenge for cloud services vendors (Weinhardt et al. 2009), 
which have slowed down the adoption of cloud computing services (Perry 2010). In 
addition, it is not easy for an individual client to monitor its cloud services usage, 
adding to the uncertainty in cost of using such services. This motivated me to conduct 
a comprehensive market survey on cloud computing services pricing mechanisms and 
to explore the underlying rationale for why they are offered.  
It is appropriate to review the different types of pricing methods currently used by 
major cloud computing services vendors, and identify the common elements for these 
different pricing methods. Although previous studies that review cloud services ven-
dors’ offerings have recognized the complexity and importance of appropriate pricing 
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strategy (Durkee 2010, Marston et al. 2011, Demirkan et al. 2008), none of them con-
ducted a careful investigation of pricing strategies for the different service layers. The 
overview of cloud service pricing complements these studies and provides a basis for 
further development of this dissertation. Furthermore, it helps to identify factors that 
reflect vendor concerns when they make pricing decisions and evaluate cloud services, 
but are missing in current pricing practices. 
I examined 19 cloud services vendors and 27 services offerings they provide, in-
cluding four major types of cloud computing services: IaaS, PaaS, SaaS, and brokered 
cloud services. IaaS delivers computer infrastructure based on virtualization technol-
ogy. PaaS has an additional layer on which clients can run applications without know-
ing how its underlying infrastructure is implemented. SaaS provides application ser-
vices functioning as locally-installed software (Vaquero 2008). Brokered cloud ser-
vices are provided by cloud services brokers who operate as intermediaries, aggrega-
tors, or arbitrageurs (Gartner 2010).  
2.2  Data  
I collected pricing information related to the major players in the cloud computing 
services market. The criteria for the selection of a vendor include: (1) the vendor must 
make pricing information on all its services available on its official web site; and (2) 
the vendor must have been selected at least once for review in Gartner’s Magic Quad-
rant Report (Leong and Chamberlin 2010, 2011; Leong et al. 2012, 2013). The series 
of reports lists cloud computing services vendors that are leaders in the market, in 
terms of revenue and market share. This is to ensure that the sample was a fair repre-
sentation of the vendors in the market.  
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From this process, I obtained 19 cloud computing services vendors that offered 27 
types of services, including 15 IaaS, 6 PaaS, 7 SaaS, and 3 cloud services brokerage 
services. (See Table 2.1.)  
Table 2.1 Cloud services vendors selected for inclusion in this research 
Service type Service name Vendor name URL 
IaaS Amazon EC2 On-Demand Instances Amazon goo.gl/fEzlD 
Amazon EC2 Reserved Instances Amazon goo.gl/fEzlD 
Amazon EC2 Spot Instances Amazon goo.gl/fEzlD 
Amazon S3 Amazon goo.gl/BcG1n 
Infrastructure-as-a-service Alatum goo.gl/w0B9d 
Enterprise VM Hosting nGrid goo.gl/ihEuI 
CloudSigma CloudSigma goo.gl/20mev 
Cloud Servers GoGrid goo.gl/6Z4bO 
Joyent Cloud Joyent goo.gl/xkcwA 
Rackspace Cloud Servers RackSpace goo.gl/cSZEA 
FlexiScale public cloud FlexiScale goo.gl/I9rwE 
IaaS Profit Bricks goo.gl/weH6L 
Google Compute Engine Google goo.gl/RehH4 
HP Cloud HP goo.gl/ZV3Fo 
CloudLayer Computing SoftLayer goo.gl/8VKj3 
PaaS Google App Engine Google goo.gl/RLtG8 
CloudFare CloudFare goo.gl/Jqt9Q 
Force.com Salesforce goo.gl/Lo8jj 
Microsoft Windows Azure Microsoft goo.gl/rDwP5 
Microsoft SQL Azure Microsoft goo.gl/rDwP5 
Amazon Beanstalk Amazon goo.gl/Tpu0E 
SaaS Service Cloud Salesforce goo.gl/7sjJf 
Sales Cloud Salesforce goo.gl/PkojZ 
Chatter Salesforce goo.gl/g7Lqq 
Jigsaw Salesforce bit.ly/g6i6Um 
Google App for Business Google goo.gl/kxkeZ 
NetSuite Financial Management NetSuite goo.gl/dtqTH 
Office 365 Microsoft goo.gl/Au3tM 
Cloud 
Brokerage 
PiCloud Public Cloud PiCloud goo.gl/JGbKT 
RigtScale Cloud ComI Editions RightScale goo.gl/PDDwl 
Integration Cloud Boomi goo.gl/oO3lz 
All information was collected from vendors’ official websites in October 2013. 
Vendors may have changed their website structures and content related to its services 
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pricing over time. 
2.3  Observations 
Pricing Innovations 
Since 2006, Amazon has been innovative in its cloud services offerings and pric-
ing. It first introduced its Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) services in 2006 and used an 
on-demand service provision model with a pay-per-use pricing mechanism. Payments 
were based on actual usage and charged in hours. After the services were announced, 
the per-hour price was not changed frequently. This is pay-per-use pricing or fixed-
price on-demand pricing. A series of pricing innovations from Amazon and its com-
petitors is presented here. (See Figure 2.1.) 
Figure 2.1 Pricing innovations 
 
In 2009, Amazon announced two other new services offerings: EC2 reserved in-
stances and EC2 spot instances. For consistency, let us call these fixed-price reserved 
services and spot-price on-demand services. Fixed-price reserved services use fixed-
price reserved pricing. A client must pay a fixed fee up front to reserve a unit of the 
services. The client still needs to pay for actual usage. But the per-hour rate was low-
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er than that in the pay-per-use model Amazon introduced in 2006 though. Spot-price 
on-demand services use a different pricing model that is auction-based. The major 
difference between spot-price on-demand services and the other options Amazon of-
fered was that the spot-price services were subject to potential interruption. This nov-
el pricing mechanism allowed Amazon to ration its idle computer resources based on 
client willingness-to-pay for the services. 
Amazon is innovative in services and pricing design, however, it has locked into a 
specific billing cycle: it always charges clients by the hour. In 2011, a Zurich-based 
IaaS vendor announced a burst-pricing scheme that had a billing cycle as short as five 
minutes. This is similar to the practices of telecommunication companies that initially 
offer monthly subscription plans only, and then start to offer per-second billing. It is 
likely that the cost associated with metering and billing in such a short interval has 
been driven down. In 2012, a cloud computing services broker, PiCloud, offered its 
clients even more value by providing a usage-consolidation service. A client can use 
1,000 compute instances, each active for one second only, and then pay the price for 
using one compute instance for 1,000 seconds. The same usage would have cost the 
client 1,000 instance hours using Amazon EC2. 
Pricing Factors 
A typical cloud computing service offering is characterized by five aspects: ser-
vice type, validity period, technical support type, service quality guarantee, and pen-
alty terms. Detailed pricing information is summarized in Appendices A1 to A4. 
Cloud computing services of different types may have different price structures 
though. For example, an IaaS offer might have many service components that are 
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charged for separately, for example, Internet usage and storage. But a SaaS offering 
may be charged with a single price for a bundle of service components. 
Based on my observations, vendors tend to give clients more choices in the type 
of service and technical support. Let us call them the “flexible parts” of cloud ser-
vices offerings. For example, IaaS and PaaS vendors provide a rich set of computing 
services with varied capacity, operation systems, and locations (see Appendices A1 
and A2). SaaS vendors and cloud brokers offer different service bundles (see Appen-
dices A3 and A4). For each service type, there are multiple choices for technical sup-
port. For the other three aspects, however, vendors provide limited options. These are 
the “inflexible parts.” For example, whatever type of service is chosen by a customer, 
the penalty term is always identical. Amazon EC2 provides a 99.95% uptime guaran-
tee but offers the same penalty term for all computing instances. So do Microsoft 
Windows Azure, Google App for Business, and Google Compute Engine. 
2.4  Nine Factors That Describe Cloud Computing Services Pricing  
Based on the market survey, there are nine pricing factors common to the various 
types of Cloud services. They fall into four groups: usage, reservation, technical sup-
port and penalty. (See Table 2.2.) 
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Table 2.2 Definitions of the nine pricing factors 
Factor Groups Pricing Factors Unit 
I. Usage 
Specifications of services, including OS, 
size, location categorical 
Unit price of usage $/unit 
Total usage units 
II. Reservation 
The length of reservation period  Hours 
One-time payment for reserved privilege 
of using the service $ 
III. Technical support Characteristics of technical supports categorical 
Periodic payment for technical support $ 
IV. Penalty 
The length of service down time Hours 
The monetary penalty for vendor not ful-
filling promises $  
In order to clearly discuss the pricing factors, it helps to understand the important 
time points in a complete cloud computing services transaction. (See Figure 2.2.) A 
client will first request a cloud services vendor for access to services. The vendor 
needs to process the request and setup the services for the client. After this setup-time, 
the client will be able to start using the cloud computing services. The usage time will 
count from this point in time until the client ends its use of the services. I call this pe-
riod reservation time, because the resources are reserved for the client’s use. Assum-
ing the client will experience a period of services being down. The period when the 
time the services go down to when the services are restored is the services down time.  
Figure 2.2 Cloud services transaction 
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Usage-based Pricing  
Usage-based pricing is optimal for information goods with negligible marginal 
production costs (Maskin and Riley 1984). Most IaaS vendors examined in this study 
use only usage-based pricing. Some of them use a combination of fixed monthly sub-
scription fee pricing and charges clients for overage with usage-based pricing though. 
The prevalence of usage-based pricing among IaaS offerings is inconsistent with the 
findings in Fishburn et al. (1997) and Sundarajan (2004), but it is consistent with the 
findings in an earlier study by Maskin and Riley (1984). The key difference in these 
studies is whether the transaction costs associated with usage-based pricing are negli-
gible. IaaS vendors commonly implement a highly-automated management system, 
which generally has very low transaction costs. It is reasonable for IaaS vendors to 
adopt this kind of pure usage-based pricing scheme. 
Prior research has suggested that fixed fee pricing, together with usage pricing, 
always outperforms pure usage-based pricing (Sundarajan 2004). Such two-part pric-
ing is always no worse than any nonlinear pricing strategy (Masuda and Whang 2006; 
Png and Wang 2010). These findings are consistent with the pricing practices in the 
cloud market. Many PaaS and SaaS vendors have adopted the two-part tariff model. 
(See Appendices A2 and A3.) Clients pay a subscription fee for default usage quotas 
and also pay an additional price if the usage exceeds the pre-assigned limit.  
Usage-based pricing are affected by the type of services and length of the usage 
period. Vendors usually offer fixed usage quotas for subscription plans. If a client us-
es more than its usage quota, usage that exceeds the quota will be charged based on 
the extra usage and unit price. The additional payment will be the product of the extra 
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usage and unit price. 
Reservation-based Pricing  
Most PaaS, SaaS, and cloud brokerage services vendors offer subscription plans 
(Appendices A2, A3, and A4). Some IaaS vendors provide similar plans too. For ex-
ample, Amazon EC2 offers clients with reserved compute instances for a period of 1 
year or 3 years, as shown in Appendix A1. 
Reservations typically are associated with increased revenue in the restaurant and 
hotel industry (Alexandrov and Lariviere 2008). In the case of hotel reservations, 
rooms usually are scarce in popular attraction areas and travelers will be willing to 
pay for reservations. This rationale does not hold in cloud services though. Compu-
ting capacity is expandable at very low cost. So clients have little incentive to reserve 
services if there is no reward (Meinl et al. 2010). From the vendors’ point of view, 
reservations benefit them by reducing their demand uncertainty because reservations 
lead to more predictable demand compared to random walk-ins. Any pre-paid reser-
vation fees can potentially enhance a vendor’s cash flow, and generate lock-in with 
clients. Therefore, vendors should incentivize clients for reservations by offering 
them favorable unit prices.  
The reservation-based price is based on the type of services used by the client, 
which involves deciding the unit price for reserving the services, and the length of the 
reservation period. Final payment for the reservation is the product of the unit price 
for the reservation and the length of the reservation period. 
Technical Support-related Pricing  
Vendors provide different levels of technical support and charge clients by service 
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type and technical support time. IaaS clients provide great flexibility in service types. 
In contrast, integrative cloud service clients have fewer choices. However, the situa-
tion is reversed with respect to technical support. This could be due to the relative 
simplicity of IaaS and PaaS services. Clients can terminate the services anytime with-
out incurring high costs. In contrast, SaaS services typically contain functions that are 
out of the client’s control. More technical support from the vendors is needed when 
problems occur. In general, the list of support provided by IaaS vendors is shorter 
than that by integrative Cloud vendors. The only exception is Amazon, which has 
been expanding its line of technical support in recent years to include four types. (See 
Appendix A1.) 
The support-related pricing is affected by the type of support services a client 
chooses and the length of the period that the support services are needed. It is a prod-
uct of the support charge rate and the length of the support period. 
Penalty-related Pricing  
Services are experience goods: their tangible features do not fully reveal their true 
value. Software outsourcing contracts have a similar issue due to information asym-
metry (Dey et al. 2010). Enhancing the completeness of the contract can help over-
come this problem, but at a high cost (Hart and Moore 1999). In the practice of soft-
ware outsourcing contracting, most vendors specify the penalties applicable when de-
livery is delayed (Whang 1992). Clients also have the right to terminate the contract.  
In cloud services, service level agreements (SLA) serve as an incomplete contract. 
Service uptime guarantees are often provided in an SLA. A typical SLA includes 
terms specifying service characteristics and an uptime guarantee of 99.9%. Corre-
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sponding penalty terms are defined in the SLA too. More often IaaS and PaaS offer-
ings provide SLAs that include both uptime guarantee and penalty terms. But only a 
small part of SaaS offerings offer SLAs, such as Google’s App for Business. 
There appear to be two major types of penalty terms. Vendors such as Amazon 
and Microsoft Azure provide monetary compensation in the form of service credits, 
while some others, such as Google, provide free usage for a certain number of days in 
case service failure occurs. (See Appendix A2.) 
2.5  Discussion  
Quantity discounts are common in pricing strategy that incentivizes buyers to 
purchase greater than usual quantity. Research has shown that second-degree price 
discrimination, a nonlinear pricing strategy such as quantity discounts, is an effective 
way for vendors to segment clients, gain market power and obtain higher profits 
(Goldman et al. 1984, Monahan 1984). In the current cloud computing services mar-
ket, only storage service vendors provide quantity discounts in the form of ladder-
shaped tariffs. (See Appendix A1.) They offer clients who use the services bigger dis-
counts on the unit prices. Other than that, quantity discounts are rarely used in any 
other categories of cloud services. For example, for an Amazon EC2 On-Demand 
Standard Instance (small) running on Linux/Unix, the pricing is fixed at $0.06 per 
instance-hour. There is no unit price difference for a customer who runs 10 instance-
hours versus one who runs 10,000 instance-hours. For information goods, past re-
search indicates that usage-based pricing with a quantity discount strategy is optimal 
when there are no transaction costs (Maskin and Riley 1984). Thus, it is viable for 
cloud vendors to include quantity discounts in pricing their services to incentivize cli-
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ents to consume more services. 
All the vendors reviewed in this study, except for Salesforce, provide uptime 
guarantees. Among these uptime guarantees, IaaS vendors do better by offering dif-
ferent uptime guarantees for different types of services. For example, Amazon pro-
vides a 99.9% uptime guarantee for S3, and a 99.95% uptime guarantee for EC2. 
Rackspace provides a 99.9% uptime guarantee for storage services and a 100% up-
time guarantee for network availability.  
Most of the SLAs include uniform penalties that the vendor must pay to all sorts 
of clients. However, the clients’ attitude toward the risk of services downtime differs 
across applications and periods. Mission-critical enterprise applications carry a high 
cost for service downtime (Hiles 2005). In order to meet the diverse expectations, the 
vendor may wish to consider including customized penalty terms. They may outper-
form uniform penalty setting. It can be mutually beneficial to provide functions for 
negotiating penalty setting to satisfy different types of clients.  
Furthermore, current cloud vendors provide a guarantee of short response time, 
ranging from hours to days, in the event of services downtime. This is different from 
a services uptime guarantee, which always includes penalty terms. There are no pen-
alty terms that cover the conditions when the promised response time is not met. In 
case vendors do not fulfill their promised response time, clients have no contractual 
protection against the breach.  
2.6  Concluding Remarks 
According to the observations made by examining pricing schemes in the cloud 
computing services market, most components that are involved in the provision of 
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computing services could be charged separately. This is a real challenge for cloud 
services vendors though. On the one hand, overly complicated pricing structures 
make potential clients step back when they realize the complexity and unpredictable 
costs due to their lack of awareness (Perry 2010). On the other hand, an overly simple 
pricing model cannot meet clients’ different needs and expectations.  
This chapter presented a market survey and an analysis in order to shed light on 
important factors that have an impact on cloud services pricing. The observations and 
findings enable a richer understanding of vendors and clients perspective to supprt the 
conduct of more rigorous analysis for cloud computing services pricing.  
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3  Fixed-Price and Spot-Price Cloud Computing Services: 
    A Damaged Services Perspective 
3.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, two different pricing mechanisms are analyzed for a cloud ser-
vices vendor: fixed-price services, which are not subject to services interruption, and 
spot-price services that are interruptible. 
Cloud computing services vendors deliver IT resources and software applications 
via the Internet. They can be scaled up and down to accommodate fluctuations in cli-
ent demand. The market for cloud computing services has grown rapidly over the past 
decade. According to 451 Research (2013), cloud computing market revenue will 
grow at a compound rate of 36% and reach US$20 billion by the end of 2016.  
Most vendors have adopted the usage-based pricing model, in which clients’ 
payments are directly tied to their usage of computing services. Cloud services are 
consumed in a way similar to electricity and water, and typically are charged by the 
minute, hour, or month. In recent years, some more innovative pricing schemes have 
been implemented. For example, in 2006, Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) 
started to sell its services based on an hourly fixed price. In 2009, Amazon allowed 
clients to purchase contracts for services sold as reserved instances. Then in 2010, 
Amazon offered services as instances with an hourly spot price. Spot prices change 
over time and, most of the time, are lower than fixed prices for reserved services, thus 
clients have an economic incentive to use them. But spot prices may also rise to a 
higher level in certain circumstances (e.g., when the services vendor is facing a short-
age of resources to back the provision of services as spot instances). When spot prices 
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rise in the presence of higher demand for its services, Amazon will interrupt any job 
that is running as a spot-priced instance whose resources are bid out at a higher price. 
In other words, the spot-price services are interruptible. Services interruption can 
cause severe consequences, resulting in disutility and financial losses on the client’s 
side. An example can be found in Howard (2011) in which a software application 
company, whose major functionalities were running as spot-priced instances, was un-
able to serve its clients for over a week. The incident was caused by a sudden spot 
price spike in September 2011, and the spot price remained at a high level for several 
hours and kept the core units of the company offline. Clients, thus, must balance the 
benefits and risks associated with the use of spot-price cloud computing services. 
Such interruptible spot-price services constitute a defective version of existing 
fixed-price reserved services. Clients perceive them as having a lower expected value 
compared to the interruption-free reserved services. Interestingly, the lower value is 
not associated with lower service costs on the vendor’s side: spot-price services share 
the same IT infrastructure with fixed-price reserved services, and their provision and 
delivery incur the same costs for the vendor. Instead, the lower value associated with 
spot-price services comes from the fact that the service vendor will deliberately im-
pose interruption risks on clients, and thus it makes the services less attractive.  
For these reasons, spot-price services are damaged services. They are similar to 
damaged goods, where a vendor has purposely modified some features of an existing 
good to make a lower quality version (Deneckere and McAfee 1996). Though it does 
not involve any additional cost savings, the damaged goods strategy has been shown 
to be an effective way to segment the market and conduct price discrimination. Will 
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the cloud vendor be able to do the same by damaging its services? It is an interesting 
research question that has not been investigated before. This work tries to seek an-
swers for it. Furthermore, a vendor can offer fixed-price reserved services or spot-
price on-demand services, or permit clients to use both. So it is interesting to ask: 
Should a vendor adopt a hybrid pricing strategy? What prices should it set? What 
level of consumer surplus can be obtained? How does social welfare change as the 
prices change? This work develops a model, and an analysis for the price and quality 
of cloud computing services offered with hybrid pricing. Based on the findings of an 
analytical model, I offer new results, and discuss some managerial implications.  
In particular, this work studies a cloud marketplace with a monopoly services 
vendor and many potential clients. The vendor considers what to offer and how to 
charge for its services. There are multiple choices: the vendor could offer fixed-price, 
interruption-free reserved services only, or damage the services by introducing some 
level of interruption risk and offer spot-price on-demand services only. Or the vendor 
could use a hybrid pricing strategy in which both types of services are made available 
to the market. Potential clients have different levels of demand for computing re-
sources. They will choose the services that give higher expected utility.  
I am interested in studying hybrid pricing strategy and will address the following 
research questions. When is it optimal for the vendor to use a hybrid pricing strategy? 
What is the appropriate service interruption level for the damaged spot-price ser-
vices? And how are consumers affected by the use of such a hybrid pricing strategy? 
This work offers insights that could help cloud vendors choose appropriate pricing 
strategy. First, it shows that offering damaged spot-price services only is always un-
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desirable. In other words, offering fixed-price reserved services alone is more profita-
ble to the vendor compared to offering spot-price services alone. It is an intuitive 
finding: with no cost reduction involved, the vendor should not damage its services 
and lower its quality from its clients’ viewpoint. Second, the hybrid pricing strategy is 
not always appropriate for the vendor. Sometimes it could be worse than if it offers 
fixed-price reserved service alone. Whether the vendor should employ the hybrid 
pricing strategy depends on two factors: the price levels for spot services and the cli-
ents’ sensitivity levels to services interruption.  
When the expected spot price is high, or clients are highly sensitive to services in-
terruption, the hybrid pricing strategy is profit-maximizing. The use of the hybrid 
pricing strategy, in many cases, will lead to larger market coverage and higher total 
social welfare, but lower consumer surplus. A more interesting result is that, under 
the hybrid pricing strategy, the vendor’s profit will be higher when the spot-price ser-
vices are subject to higher interruption risks. This suggests that the vendor should de-
liberately damage its spot-price services by attaching a high level of services interrup-
tion risk to them, so that they will not compete with the fixed-price reserved services 
too severely and hurt the vendor. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 reviews related litera-
ture. Section 3.2 presents the model setting. Section 3.3 lays out the analyses and ma-
jor findings. Section 3.4 discusses some model extensions and possible impacts on the 
results. Section 3.5 explores the managerial implications of this research and Section 
3.6 concludes. 
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3.2  Literature 
This work is built on two streams of research: pricing goods and services with un-
certain demand, and quality differentiation. Three other areas of inquiry on pricing 
goods and services with uncertain demand are related to this work. One is research on 
information goods, the second is on peak-load pricing, and the third is on revenue 
yield management.  
The research on pricing information goods has analyzed business models with 
fixed fees and usage-based fees. Sridhar et al. (2009) developed a model in which 
demand was uncertain in clients’ usage frequency and utility-per-use of the goods and 
services, and showed that a monopolist should employ usage-based pricing when 
transaction costs are low. With competition though, fixed pricing often outperforms 
usage-based pricing. This result is also supported by other research on selling elec-
tronic goods with fixed subscription fees or with pay-per-use fees (Fishburn et al. 
1997, Fishburn and Odlyzko 1999). These works all considered zero marginal pro-
duction costs and positive transaction costs associated with pay-per-use pricing. 
Sundararajan (2004) reported that a monopolist using both performed no worse in the 
presence of positive transaction costs—and sometimes better—than when only using 
usage-based pricing. The setting in this research is similar, but spot prices are differ-
ent from usage-based prices. Usage-based pricing involves a fixed payment per unit. 
In the current setting, spot prices vary over time and involve unexpected services in-
terruption. This novel usage-based pricing has not been studied in the IT services-
related literature yet.  
The second line of work deals with peak-load pricing for non-storable products 
such as electric power, where price discrimination is appropriate, and linear (Steiner 
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1957) or convex (Boiteux 1960) costs have been assumed. Understanding the cost 
structure, the relationship between marginal production cost and the capacity of the 
plant, is critical (Wilson 1972). However, this study does not consider the problem of 
capacity planning for cloud vendors. Nevertheless, it will consider a special condition 
under which the vendor can use capacity as a tool to improve its profit.  
The third line of related research is revenue yield management, in which pric-
ing—among several other aspects such as inventory control and overbooking—is an 
important aspect (McGill and Van Ryzin 1999). Gallego and Van Ryzin (1997) 
showed that, when studying the revenue management for airline tickets, there is a 
natural duality between ticket prices and seat-allocation decisions. In light of this du-
ality, Li (1994) proved that it is optimal to offer a small number of fare classes, with 
different restrictions, such as introducing non-refundable and no-luggage conditions. 
In addition, the airlines have used spot prices with infrequent changes, and leveraged 
high and low prices to ration capacity (Dana 1999). Different from these previous 
works, for Amazon.com’s EC2 services, hourly spot-price changes have been used to 
support value-based resource allocation. 
Another related stream of research includes studies on quality differentiation.  
Quality differentiation enables the vendors to segment the market and price discrimi-
nate. The structure of large sunk costs and low variable costs (for producing the prod-
uct of different qualities) makes versioning suitable for value-based pricing and quali-
ty differentiation. Prior studies on information goods suggest a limited number of ver-
sions of the information goods with different quality levels should be offered. Varian 
(1997) suggested offering different versions when clients have different preferences 
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for quality, or their preferences are hard to observe. A common rule of thumb is to 
offer only two versions: a high quality version and a low quality version. This applies 
to the settings in this work: it studies whether a cloud services vendor should offer the 
services with different quality levels at different market prices. Some other works on 
damaged goods are related. It has been well-documented how manufacturers can im-
prove their profits by intentionally damaging a portion of their goods and then em-
ploying price discrimination (Deneckere and McAfee 1996). The improvement in 
profit, however, does not depend on the distribution of client valuations, but instead 
on the value of the damaged goods relative to the undamaged ones (McAfee 2007). 
3.3  The Model 
Consider a monopoly vendor that offers fixed-price reserved services and spot-
price on-demand services. To use the reserved services, clients must buy a reserved 
services contract. They pay the reserved services price PReserved in advance to reserve 
N units of resources. (See Table 3.1 for modeling notation.)  
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Table 3.1 Model Variables and Parameters 
VARIABLE  DEFINITION 
 P Prices for a cloud computing services contract (with Reserved or Hybrid subscripts) 
 NReserved, Nit 
Resource capacity limit of reserved services contract, the num-
ber of client i’s reserved services units left at the beginning of 
period t 
 PSpot (t), 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡; 
PL , PH 
Spot price (at time t) and expected spot price; low and high spot 
prices 
ProbL, ProbH Probability of low or high spot prices (ProbH = 1 - ProbL) 
 ProbInterruption 
Probability of spot-price services interruption, ProbInterruption = 
ProbL(1 - ProbL) 
 v, ?̅?, v0; vL, vH 
Single job value, expected value, threshold job value of submis-
sion strategy in the limited reserved services capacity case; low-
er bound, upper bound on job value  
 λi, 𝜆𝐻𝑡+ , Λ 
Job arrival rate of client I; job arrival rate of client i in the other 
periods after period t; maximum job arrival rate   
UReserved, USpot 
A client’s utility from jobs run with fixed-price reserved ser-
vices; a client’s utility from jobs run with spot-price on-demand 
services 
 γ Clients’ sensitivity to services interruption  
𝑣� Expected job utility difference for reserved and spot-price ser-vices 
 π  Vendor’s profit (with Reserved, Spot or Hybrid subscripts) 
 CS, SW Consumer surplus; social welfare (with Reserved, Spot or Hy-brid subscripts) 
To use the spot-price services, a client will pay the current spot price. I examined 
spot price data from Amazon EC2 from January to July 2012, and found that spot 
prices were at the base level much of the time, but fluctuated between the base level 
and a higher price for the rest of the time. A model with spot prices as a variable with 
two values is appropriate: a low price PL with a probability of ProbL, and a high price 
PH with a probability of ProbH = 1 - ProbL. Here, PL, PH, ProbL, and ProbH are com-
mon knowledge to the vendor and its clients. 
The model covers multiple periods. (See Figure 3.1.) At the beginning of each, 
the spot price PSpot (t) will change and be announced to all clients. Such services can 
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be interrupted when capacity is limited and the spot price rises. Consider job j. At 
time t, the spot price PSpot(t) is announced by the vendor. A client submits job j during 
time t and t + 1 for spot-price services. At time t + 1, the vendor revises the spot price 
to PSpot (t + 1) in the presence of new demand. If PSpot (t + 1) > PSpot (t), job j will be 
interrupted by the vendor and the client will not pay anything. If PSpot (t + 1) ≤ PSpot 
(t), job j will execute to completion, and the client will pay PSpot (t). To simplify, each 
job execution will take one unit of time, so each job is subject to one spot price 
change.  
Figure 3.1 Job executions and payment timeline 
 
Clients have heterogeneous demand in terms of the number of jobs that need to be 
run. I only consider their jobs that will arrive in the time period described in Figure 
3.1. Client i’s jobs arrive following a Poisson distribution with the arrival rate λi, and 
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across all periods. I use the Poisson 
job arrival process because it has attractive theoretical properties yet well describes 
job arrivals in real world data center (Frost and Melamed 1994, Li et al. 2006), and it 
has been widely used by previous research (Li et al. 2006, Li et al. 2007, Parolini et al. 
2010). Some clients will have more jobs. The job arrival rate λi is uniformly distribut-
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cumulative distribution function. Each client knows its own λi, while the cloud com-
puting services vendor only knows the distribution of λ. 
The jobs have varied value to clients. This reflects the reality that a client may use 
cloud computing services for different purposes. The value of a single job follows a 
uniform distribution over the range (vL, vH). And all the clients have the same job-
value distribution. If a spot-price job is interrupted, the client will incur disutility -γv, 
proportional to the job value v, with 0 < γ < 1. Here γ measures a client’s sensitivity to 
services interruption. Let us further assume that PH < vL. This means that spot-price 
services are cheap, so most clients stay in the market. 
3.4  Analysis and Results 
Consider a market in which only fixed-price reserved services are offered, and 
then a market in which only spot-price on-demand services are offered by the vendor. 
My analysis will consider hybrid pricing, and will compare these three markets in 
terms of the vendor’s profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare. 
Vendor Offers Services with Single Pricing Scheme 
A vendor’s decision on pricing when it offers its cloud computing services with 
one type of pricing scheme alone affects its profit, and consumer surplus, and social 
welfare. I will discuss the case when the vendor only offers the fixed-price reserved 
services, and then the case when the vendor only offers spot-price on-demand ser-
vices.  
Fixed-Price, Non-Interruptible, Reserved Services Only. When the vendor of-
fers its computing resources through reserved services only, its clients need to choose 
 35 
  
whether to purchase a reserved services contract. The decision has to be made at the 
beginning of the k-period timeline (see Figure 3.1 for the timeline) at time 0. The op-
timal reserved services contract (𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ , 𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ ) can be derived with the pro-
posed model.  
Lemma 1, presented first, states that the vendor should not set any capacity limit 
in the reserved services contract, if it wishes to achieve optimality. Limiting resource 
capacity will reduce a client’s valuation of the contract. The vendor will have to low-
er its price or tolerate a decrease in demand, and will lose profit as a result. 
• Lemma 1 (Capacity Limit of Optimal Reserved Services Contract). When 
a cloud vendor offers reserved services only, any finite limit of resource ca-
pacity N is not optimal. 
When the vendor offers unconstrained usage in a reserved services contract, a cli-
ent will be able to have all its job arrivals executed on reserved services. The client 
whose expected total utility from job executions equal to the reserved services con-
tract price PReserved will be indifferent between purchasing the contract and staying out 
of the market. Let 𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  be the job arrival rate for this marginal client. Then 
𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗ ?̅? = PReserved, where ?̅? represents the expected job value. The vendor’s profit 
function is πReserved = (1 - F(𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ ))PReserved, and it will maximize profit by choos-
ing an appropriate price. 
• Proposition 1 (Reserved Pricing Strategy). When the cloud vendor offers 
reserved services only, it should price the services contract at 𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  = ?̅?Λ 
/ 2 and not constrain the capacity limit to 𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ . 
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The marginal client will have job arrival rate 𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  =Λ / 2, the vendor’s profit 
will be 𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  =?̅?Λ / 4, and  consumer surplus and total social welfare will be 
C𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  = ?̅?Λ / 8 and S𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  = 3?̅?Λ / 8. At the optimum, half of the market, 
including those clients with a high level of demand, will purchase the reserved ser-
vices contract. The vendor will receive a major portion of the total social welfare, as 
its profit is two times the consumer surplus.  
Spot-Price, Interruptible, On-Demand Services Only. Consider a market 
where a vendor offers only spot-price services. Spot prices are assumed to be exoge-
nously determined. The vendor controls the price change frequency: it decides the 
probability of a low price (PL) and a high price (PH) to appear. Thus, it can maximize 
profit via an optimal valued ProbL, the probability of a low spot price to occur.  
The vendor, however, cannot set the probability of PL and PH too low. Consider a 
job that arrives during [t, t + 1]. When it is submitted, the spot services price is PSpot(t); 
and during its execution the spot price will be revised to PSpot(t + 1). If PSpot(t) = PH, 
the service interruption probability for this job is zero and the expected net utility for 
the client is v - PH. If PSpot(t) = PL, the probability of service interruption is 1-ProbL. 
The expected net utility for the client then becomes (v - PL) ProbL - γv (1 – ProbL) = v 
(ProbL + γ ProbL - γ) - PL ProbL. Note that when ProbL, the probability of PL to occur, 
is very small, ProbL < vH γ / [vH (1 + γ) - PL], the vendor will not be able to operate the 
spot-price services. It is likely that a job runs with spot-price services will be inter-
rupted when its price is PL, so the client’s net utility will always be negative. As a re-
sult, no client will submit a job for spot-price services when PL is observed. In addi-
tion, when vH γ / [vH (1 + γ) - PL] ≤ ProbL < vL γ / [vL (1 + γ) - PL], only jobs with high 
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value will yield positive expected net utility. In order to make the analysis more com-
prehensive and interesting, let us consider a scenario in which clients will submit all 
their jobs for spot-price services. Hereafter, this condition ProbL ≥ vL γ / [vL (1 + γ) - 
PL] is assumed to hold. 
Since all clients will use spot services, the demand for spot services is Λ / 2. The 
vendor’s profit will be πSpot = (PL Pro𝐻𝐿2 - PH ProbL + PH) Λ / 2. The vendor’s deci-
sion is to set the probability of a low spot price Pro𝐻𝐿∗. This solution turns out to be 
dependent on the ratio of PH to PL, as shown by Proposition 2. 
• Proposition 2 (Spot Pricing Strategy). When a cloud vendor offers spot ser-
vices only, it should set Pro𝐻𝐿∗ as follows: 
Case (1)    when PH ≥ PL(1 + 
𝛾𝑅𝐿(1+𝛾) 𝑅𝐿−𝑃𝐿), Pro𝐻𝐿∗ = 𝛾𝑅𝐿(1+𝛾) 𝑅𝐿−𝑃𝐿; and 
Case (2)    when PH < PL(1 + 
𝛾𝑅𝐿(1+𝛾) 𝑅𝐿−𝑃𝐿), Pro𝐻𝐿∗→1. 
In Case (1), when the difference in spot prices is large, the probability of services 
interruption should be decreasing in γ. In the extreme case of γ  0, meaning that a 
client incurs almost zero disutility from interruption, the vendor will not need to offer 
spot-price services. In Case (2), when the difference in spot prices is small, the ven-
dor’s best action is to set Pro𝐻𝐿∗ equal to 1, so any service interruption risk vanishes. 
The Spot Price Strategy Proposition (P2) shows that how often the vendor should 
make an upward price adjustment depends on the relative magnitude of PH and PL, 
and is moderated by the client’s sensitivity to services interruption γ. There are two 
cases. Which case the vendor will face is determined by the outcome of the compari-
son between the high spot price PH and a compound term including the low spot price 
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PL (1 + 
𝛾𝑅𝐿(1+𝛾) 𝑅𝐿−𝑃𝐿). The latter term is increasing in the client’s sensitivity to services 
interruption γ. Therefore, the result of the comparison will possibly be different at dif-
ferent levels of γ. That means the vendor may face Case (1) as described in Proposi-
tion 2 when γ is small, and will face Case (2) when γ is big. 
The vendor’s profit will also be different in the two cases. The following corollary 
shows this finding. 
Corollary 1. The vendor will gain a higher profit when it is able to follow Case (1) 
described in Proposition 2. 
In addition, in Case (1), consumer surplus will be much lower compared to Case 
(2), due to a higher level of services interruption risk introduced by the vendor. As a 
result, social welfare will also be lower. 
Vendor Offers Fixed-Price and Spot-Price Services: Hybrid Pricing Strategy 
Pricing strategy. Hybrid pricing may cause two opposite effects. Spot-price ser-
vices will serve clients who stay out of the market before the services become availa-
ble. This will increase the usage of a vendor’s infrastructure and generate more profit 
for the vendor. Spot-price services may cannibalize the fixed-price services though. 
Some clients who would have purchased reserved services may now opt for spot-
price services. So the effect of offering spot-price services in addition to existing 
fixed-price cloud computing services is unclear.  
The indifferent client will obtain the same expected utility from using reserved 
and spot-price services. This client is identified via the job arrival rate: 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗  = PRe-
served  / (?̅? (1 + γ) ProbL ProbH + PL Pro𝐻𝐿2 + PH ProbH). For simplicity, let us introduce 
𝑣� = ?̅?(1 + γ) ProbL ProbH + PL Pro𝐻𝐿2 + PH ProbH, and hence 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗  = PReserved / 𝑣�. 
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The vendor then needs to maximize profit πHybrid = (1 - 
2𝑅�  − 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡
2𝑅�2𝛬
PReserved) PReserved. The 
vendor will decide: (1) the optimal price for the fixed-price reserved services contract 
(𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗ ), and (2) the probability that low spot prices will occur (Pro𝐻𝐿∗). Solving the 
vendor’s optimization problem leads to: 
• Proposition 3 (Hybrid Pricing Strategy). To implement the hybrid pricing 
strategy, the vendor should price a reserved services contract at 𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗  = 
𝑣�2Λ / (2𝑣� - 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡). In addition, the vendor should always configure the opti-
mal value of Pro𝐻𝐿∗ to be smaller than 0.5 and Pro𝐻𝐿∗ is increasing in client 
sensitivity to service interruption γ.  
As a result, clients with job arrival rates greater than 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗  = 𝑣�Λ / (2𝑣� - 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡) 
will purchase fixed-price reserved services, while the rest will use spot-price on-
demand services. The vendor’s profit will be 𝜋𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗  = 𝑣�2Λ / (4𝑣� - 2𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡). 
Several findings are salient. First, due to the cannibalization effects, fewer clients 
will purchase the fixed-price reserved services contract. Second, the market share of 
fixed-price services is always smaller than that of spot-price services. This means that 
the market will have more clients using spot services than reserved services. Third, 
with hybrid pricing, the vendor’s profit will come from both fixed-price and spot-
price services. Though spot-price on-demand services will attract the majority of the 
clients, which services contribute more to the vendor’s total profit will depend on cli-
ents’ sensitivity to services interruption. If clients incur high disutility due to services 
interruptions (e.g., when γ > 1 - 𝑃
�𝑆
2𝑅�𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐻
), fixed-price reserved services will yield 
higher profit for the vendor than spot-price on-demand services. If clients incur low 
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disutility from services interruptions (e.g., when γ < 1 - 𝑃
�𝑆
2 𝑅� 𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐻), spot-price 
services will contribute more. So, the interruptible and uninterruptible services will 
not be equally profitable to the vendor, except when γ = 1 - 𝑃
�𝑆
2 𝑅 �𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐻. 
Finally, the vendor should increase the reserved services price and the probability 
of a low spot-price level in the market when clients are increasingly sensitive to ser-
vices interruptions as γ increases. This will improve the vendor’s profit. The underly-
ing rationale is as follows. Spot-price services with interruption risks are inferior. 
Making such services subject to higher interruption risks increases the value differ-
ence between the services. As a result, the vendor is able to raise its price for reserved 
services and can segment the market based on client self-selection behavior. 
The effect of γ on ProbInterruption is moderated by the spot-price ratio PH / PL. (See 
Figure 3.2.) Based on the optimal value of Pro𝐻𝐿∗, interruption risk ProbInterruption in-
creases as client sensitivity to services interruption γ increases. On the other hand, at 
the same level of γ, say γ = 0.9, when PH goes from 0.75 to 1.5, interruption risk de-
creases. 
Figure 3.2 Probability of services interruption as a function of interruption risk 
sensitivity 
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Impact of spot-price interruptible services on fixed-price reserved services. 
Next will be the comparison of the vendor’s profit under different strategies. I have 
proved that, with a one-price strategy, in general, it will make sense for the vendor to 
offer fixed-priced reserved services, since they are more profitable than spot-price on-
demand services. With the hybrid pricing strategy, however, profit may or may not 
increase.  
• Proposition 4 (Impact of Spot-Price On-Demand Services). A sufficient 
condition for the vendor to increase its profit by introducing spot-price ser-
vices in addition to the existing fixed-price reserved services is 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 / ?̅? ≥ 0.5, 
where 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 is the expected spot price, ?̅? is the expected job value. The greater 
the clients’ sensitivity to services interruption risk is, the higher profit the 
vendor obtains. 
This proposition reveals a key finding: the hybrid pricing strategy may be benefi-
cial or hazardous to the vendor. The spot prices (PL and PH) and clients’ sensitivity to 
services interruption (γ) determine how the vendor’s profit changes. When clients are 
sensitive to services interruption, the vendor is likely to gain a profit increase by of-
fering spot-price services in addition to fixed-price reserved services.  
This finding may seem counter-intuitive, but there is some rationale for it. Recall 
that there is a cannibalization effect when introducing spot-price services to market 
with existing fixed-price reserved services. It will improve the vendor’s profit only if 
the spot-price services are not too attractive: clients will need to bear high disutility 
once jobs are interrupted. (See Figure 3.3.) 
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Figure 3.3 The vendor’s profit versus interruption risk sensitivity 
  a. 𝑷�𝑺𝒑𝒐𝒕 / 𝒗� < 0.5                                                b. 𝑷�𝑺𝒑𝒐𝒕 / 𝒗� ≥ 0.5 
         
Note: The simulation values in the left-side figure are PL = 1.3, PH = 1.5. In the right-side figure, 
they are PL = 1.4, PH = 1.6; ?̅? = 3. All the other parameters are the same in both figures. 
The main difference between the parameter settings in Figure 3.3 (a) and Figure 
3.3 (b) is in the relationship between the expected spot price 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 and the expected 
job value ?̅?. The example in Figure 3.3 (a) indicates that, when the condition 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 / 
?̅? ≥ 0.5 does not hold, the hybrid pricing strategy could improve the vendor’s profit 
only when clients are very sensitive to services interruption. If  𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 / ?̅? ≥ 0.5 holds, 
as shown in Figure 3.3 (b), the vendor will always achieve higher profit by offering 
spot services in addition to reserved services. 
Consumer surplus and social welfare. Adding spot-price on-demand services to 
existing fixed-price reserved services always leads to a market expansion. This may 
not result in a higher overall consumer surplus or social welfare though. So we can 
conclude: 
• Proposition 5 (Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare). A sufficient condi-
tion under which adding spot-price on-demand services will increase consum-
er surplus is: γ < (1 / 2 - 2𝑃�𝑆 / ?̅?). When either of the two conditions holds, (1) 
PH / ?̅? < 0.943 or (2) γ < 0.939, adding spot-price on-demand services will in-
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crease social welfare. 
The condition for increasing consumer surplus will not be easily met when the 
high spot price PH is much higher than the low spot price PL. Building on the prior 
numerical analysis, a critical value (2 - 4(PL Pro𝐻𝐿2 + PH ProbH) / ?̅?) can be calculated 
and compared with the clients’ sensitivity to services interruption γ. When PH is much 
higher than PL, the clients’ sensitivity to services interruption is almost always higher 
than the calculated critical value. (See Figure 3.4 when PH = 1.5.) When the high spot 
price is much higher than the low spot price, consumer surplus is likely to decrease. 
Figure 3.4 Critical value of the clients’ sensitivity γ to interruption risk based on 
the optimal probability of a low spot price to occur 
 
On the other hand, when the high spot price is close to the low spot price (see 
Figure 3.4 when PH = 0.75) clients will achieve higher consumer surplus for most of 
the time. This is indicated by the two dashed lines with square and diamond marks at 
the top. (See Figure 3.4.) 
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Figure 3.5 Consumer surplus and social welfare comparisons 
         
Note: The assumed values in the figure are: vL = 2, vH = 4, PL = 1.4, PH = 1.6, Λ = 100. 
Adding spot-price on-demand services will expand the market size for the vendor, 
so more clients will be served, which has the potential to increase social welfare. It is 
not straightforward to determine whether social welfare will increase or decrease 
though. The vendor will be able to sell fixed-price reserved services to fewer clients, 
compared to when spot-price on-demand services are not offered. With fewer cloud 
computing jobs executed as either spot services or reserved services, there is a greater 
possibility that they will be completed, resulting in full job utility for clients. The 
profit decrease in reserved services, however, will be much smaller when clients are 
highly sensitive to services interruptions. Plus, with the additional jobs that get com-
pleted with spot-price on-demand services, the overall level of social welfare may 
increase. But this will occur only when the clients’ sensitivity (γ) exceeds the critical 
value given in the Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare Proposition (P5). 
3.5  Model Extensions 
To this point in the chapter, the focus has been on fixed-price, no capacity limit 
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it needs. So clients with higher demand pay, on average, a lower price for each ser-
vice unit they consume than clients with lower demand. The price discount is only 
limited by the client’s demand. It means that the higher a client’s demand, the more 
discount will the client get from using the fixed-price reserved services.  
If the vendor introduces a services capacity limit on a reserved services contract, 
there will be two possible effects. First, the reserved services will become less attrac-
tive. As a result, probably fewer clients will buy it. Second, clients with high demand 
will find the reserved services contract to be insufficient to handle all their jobs. They 
will submit some of the jobs for spot-price on-demand services. Furthermore, since 
jobs are heterogeneous in their value, high-value jobs will be more likely to be sub-
mitted for reserved services. The first effect will potentially cause the vendor to lose 
profit, while the second effect may increase it. The overall effect on the vendor’s 
profit of introducing services capacity limit is unclear.  
It is common in practice that a service vendor will limit the capacity that the client 
can access and consume. I will next consider this case, when the vendor puts a ca-
pacity limit on its reserved services contracts. The term capacity refers to the usage 
upper limit associated with a reserved services contract. 
Clients’ Decision for Job Submission 
Consider a client’s job submission decision when the vendor uses a hybrid pricing 
strategy and assigns a capacity limit to the reserved services contract. When there is 
no capacity limit, clients who purchased the reserved services contract will submit all 
their jobs for reserved services. But their job submission behavior will change if ca-
pacity is limited. Using reserved services can secure the completion of a job for the 
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client. But using spot-price services will force the client to bear the risk of services 
interruption and potential disutility. In addition, when reserved resources are limited 
and job value varies, the client will try to use the limited reserved services to secure 
as much value as possible. Clients with high demand will submit some jobs for spot-
price services and save reserved resources for future use. The impact of this job sub-
mission strategy and how the vendor’s profit will be affected are worthy of further 
study. 
Consider one simple example. When two jobs arrive, one with a high value and 
the other with a low value, and when the reserved services contracts are limited to 
five units and there are four periods in total, using reserved services to complete the 
high-value job and using spot-price services to execute the low-value job is an opti-
mal strategy. My choice of five units and four periods is for illustration: it does not 
mean that clients will change their job submission behavior because of the limit of 
this specific number of service units or number of periods. It is to show that, although 
a client still has enough reserved resources for all job executions in certain period, it 
may save some for high-value jobs that will arrive in the future. The principle is to 
only let low-value jobs face the risk of services interruption. The same principle ap-
plies when there are more than two arriving jobs and insufficient reserved resources.  
When the reserved resources are not enough, the client needs to decide which jobs 
to submit for reserved services, and which jobs to submit for spot-price services. Ac-
cording to the principle I just discussed, the client needs to decide a threshold value v0 
that separates arriving jobs into two groups: a high-value group that will go to re-
served services, and a low value group that will go to spot-price services.  
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The threshold job value v0, however, has to be revised in each period, due to the 
fact that clients are uncertain about the exact number of jobs that will arrive in the 
future. At the beginning of period t, client i will know how many jobs have arrived 
and have been executed and how many units of reserved services are left. It will also 
update the distribution of future job arrivals, which follows a Poisson distribution 
with job arrival rate 𝜆𝐻𝑡+  = �
𝜆𝑖
𝑘
� × (k – t + 1). Let Nit be the number of the client’s re-
served services units left at the beginning of period t. Then we can derive v0 for client 
i at period t: 𝑣𝐻𝑡0  = vL + (1 - min(1, Nit / 𝜆𝐻𝑡+ ))(vH - vL). 
The threshold job value (v0) changes over time. To illustrate this, I simulated the 
job arrival process for a client with a job arrival rate λ = 100 in a 100-period timeline. 
The threshold job value will be updated at the beginning of each period before any 
job arrives. The capacity limit associated with a reserved services contract is set at 
four levels: N takes one of the four values in the set {8,000, 9,000, 10,000, 11,000}. 
The job arrival process over the 100 periods is simulated 10,000 times. The average 
threshold job value is calculated for each period. (See Figure 3.6.) When the capacity 
limit is less than overall job arrivals, as in the cases N =8,000 and N = 9,000 shown in 
Figure 3.6, clients will start to save reserved resources earlier for future use. When 
the capacity limit is equal to or greater than overall job arrivals, as the cases N = 
11,000 and N = 11,000, clients will either start to save reserved resources later or not 
save them at all. 
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Figure 3.6 The dynamic threshold for job value  
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ingness-to-pay for the service. The flatter slope, however, indicates that when clients 
are strategic in job submission, they are more sensitive to changes in the price of the 
reserved services contracts when their job arrival rate exceeds capacity limit N than 
when their job arrival rates are less than capacity limit N.  
Figure 3.7 The utility UReserved of strategic and non-strategic clients with different 
job arrival rates λ 
 
Note: The parameter values are: vL = 2, vH = 4, N = 10000, and k = 100. 
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reached, its net utility will be UReserved = ∫ ?̅?
𝑁
0
x fλ(x)dx + ∫ ?̅?
∞
𝑁
N fλ(x)dx - PReserved. The 
first term is the expected total utility gained when the number of total arrived jobs is 
less than the capacity limit N, and the second term represents the expected total utility 
when the number of total arrived jobs exceeds the capacity limit N. When job arrivals 
exceed the capacity limit, the utility is bounded at ?̅?N. As a result, the overall net util-
ity will be smaller when capacity is limited than when capacity is not limited.  
In addition, even if the client is strategic in job submissions, its overall expected 
utility will still be lower. While the total utility from using spot-price services for all 
job arrivals is not affected by the capacity limit, the client who, in the unlimited ca-
pacity case, is indifferent between purchasing the reserved services contract and pur-
chasing spot services will find it no longer worth buying now. Because UReserved in-
creases in the client’s demand (based on the job arrival rate λ), the marginal client 
will have higher demand. Consequently, the vendor will lose some clients for re-
served services, which will lead to a lower profit. On the other hand, job arrivals that 
exceed the capacity limit will be processed by spot-price services, which will yield 
additional profit for the vendor. The overall effect of the limited capacity of the re-
served services contract will depend on the magnitude of the capacity limit. 
A second observation is that limiting the resource capacity associated with a re-
served services contract will make the overall spot services usage increase. A client 
with high demand will submit some jobs for spot-price services even if it has already 
purchased the reserved services contract, because the capacity limit may not be suffi-
cient for all of its jobs. In addition, some clients will refrain from buying reserved 
services due to the capacity limit. As a result, overall spot services usage will increase.  
 51 
  
Following the above discussions, along with the hybrid pricing strategy, we can 
see a potential for capacity to be used as a tool to further improve the vendor’s profit. 
This is similar to the practice of rationing the availability of capacity that is sold at a 
lower price. This is known as yield management, which has been commonly practiced 
by airlines, hotels, and several other industries (Dana 1999). The cloud computing 
services vendor’s problem now is whether it can limit the capacity associated with the 
reserved services contract to an appropriate level so that its profit will increase.  
To find out the answer, I first need to re-examine the demand of the marginal cli-
ent and find out to what extent the profit from reserved services will be affected. 
When there is a capacity limit, the job arrival rate of the marginal client must satisfy 
the condition: 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗
′
 = argλ{∫ ?̅?
𝑁
0
x fλ(x)dx + ∫ ?̅?
∞
𝑁
N fλ(x)dx - PReserved + ∫ 𝑈𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡
∞
𝑁
(x - 
N) fλ(x)dx = λUSpot}. The first term in the bracket represents the utility when the num-
ber of total jobs is less than the capacity limit, the second term is the utility from jobs 
running with reserved services when the number of total jobs exceeds the capacity 
limit, and the fourth term represents the net utility from jobs that cannot run with re-
served services due to the capacity limit but run with spot-price services. It can be 
simplified: 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗
′
 = argλ{∫ 𝑣�
𝑁
0
x fλ(x)dx + ∫ 𝑣�
∞
𝑁
N fλ(x)dx - PReserved = 0}. Here 𝑣� is the 
difference in utilities from a single job execution with reserved and spot-price ser-
vices.  
When there is a capacity limit associated with reserved services contracts, the 
demand of the marginal client will be higher than that in the case of unlimited re-
served capacity. The term ∫ 𝑣�
𝑁
0
x fλ(x)dx + ∫ 𝑣�
∞
𝑁
N fλ(x)dx - PReserved is the increase in a 
client’s surplus from using reserved services with limited capacity compared to using 
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spot-price services. Similarly, the term ∫ 𝑣�
𝑁
0
x fλ(x)dx + ∫ 𝑣�
∞
𝑁
x fλ(x)dx - PReserved is the 
increase in a client’s surplus from using reserved services without a capacity limit 
compared to using spot-price services. The increase in the client’s surplus will be 
smaller when the reserved capacity is limited than when it is unlimited. This applies 
to all clients. Further, note that ∫ 𝑣�
𝑁
0
x fλ(x)dx + ∫ 𝑣�
∞
𝑁
x fλ(x)dx - PReserved is equivalent to 
𝑣�𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅
∗′  - PReserved. This leads to the inequality 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗
′
 > PReserved / 𝑣� = 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗ , 
which suggests that fewer clients will choose to purchase the reserved services con-
tract when capacity is limited.  
Figure 3.8 shows the market segmentations when the reserved services contract 
has limited and unlimited capacity. Let 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗  denote the demand of the marginal 
client in the case of unlimited capacity, and 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗
′
 denote the demand of the mar-
ginal client in the case of limited capacity, Figure 3.8 shows that 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗  < 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗
′
. 
When there is no capacity limit, clients with job arrival rates less than 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗   will 
use spot-price services only and the rest will purchase reserved services contracts. 
When capacity is limited, the client with the job arrival rate 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗   will no longer 
find it attractive to buy the reserved services contract. This will also be true for clients 
with job arrival rates between 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗   and 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗
′
. Only those with job arrival rates 
higher than 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗
′
 will purchase reserved services contract. They will also use some 
spot-price services. Clients with job arrival rates lower than 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗
′
 will use spot-
price service only.  
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Figure 3.8 Market segments 
 
In Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10, several numerical examples illustrate the impacts 
of the resource capacity limit on the vendor’s profit, usage of spot services, and the 
market share of reserved services. The parameter values that are used in the numerical 
examples are shown below the figures. The optimal price of the reserved services 
contract is 𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  = $99.42, which is calculated based on the Hybrid Pricing Strat-
egy Proposition (P3). By varying N from 60 to 100, it is possible to calculate the cor-
responding demand of the marginal client in terms of its job arrival rate, the usage of 
spot-price services, and the vendor’s profit. Figure 3.9 indicates that the overall usage 
of spot-price services decreases with the capacity limit N, as does the demand of the 
marginal client. This suggests that the demand for reserved services will exhibit a 
monotonic decrease in the capacity limit.  
 
 
 
 
−𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
∗  𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻∗  
0 
𝛬 
𝑣� 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻∗ − 𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐻𝑣𝑅𝐻∗  
infinite N 
finite N 
 
𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
∗′  
𝛬/2 
 
Utility from 
reserved services  
Utility from 
spot-price services  
Client demand 
Net utility 
 54 
  
Figure 3.9 Spot-price services usage and the demand of the marginal client 
 
Note: The assumed values in the figure are: vL = 2, vH = 4, PL = 0.5, PH = 1, ProbL = 0.5, γ 
= 0.3, and Λ = 100. 
Figure 3.10 shows that the vendor’s profit is concave in the capacity limit N. 
When capacity is limited and above a certain value, the vendor’s gain in profit from 
additional usage of spot-price services will be larger than the reduction in profit due 
to the decreased sales of the reserved services contracts. Overall profit will start to 
decrease if the vendor further reduces the capacity of the reserved services contract. 
As in Figure 3.9, the vendor will start to lose profit when capacity is limited to a val-
ue lower than 70. 
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Figure 3.10 The vendor’s total profit when resource capacity is finite in the 
reserved services contract 
 
Note: The assumed values are: vL = 2, vH = 4, PL = 0.5, PH = 1, ProbL = 0.5, γ = 0.3, and Λ 
= 100. 
The next step is to formulate the vendor’s optimization problem. The vendor 
needs to decide the price for reserved services PHybrid, the capacity limit N, and the 
probability for a low spot price to occur ProbL, based on: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑃𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑,𝑁,𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐿){(1 – F(𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗ )) PReserved + F(𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗ ) E(λ| λ < 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗ ) 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡} 
Here 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗  = argλ{∫ ?̅?
𝑁
0
x fλ(x)dx + ∫ ?̅?
∞
𝑁
N fλ(x)dx – PReserved + ∫ 𝑈𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡
∞
𝑁
(x - N) fλ(x)dx   
= λUSpot} indicates the demand of the marginal client who will be indifferent buying 
or not buying the reserved services contract. The constraint ProbL ≥ γvL / [(1+γ) vL - 
PL] applies because otherwise clients will not submit any jobs to the spot-price ser-
vices. 
Due to the complexity of this problem, it is mathematically intractable. In-
stead, I derived the solution through a computational approach in the following 
way. The vendor tests all possible N within a reasonable range, such as (Λ/2, Λ) or 
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(Λ/3, Λ), and optimizes PReserved at each value of N. The optimal value of ProbL 
can always be found within (0, 1/2), as stated in the Hybrid Pricing Strategy 
Proposition (P3), or at the boundary 0 or ½.  
3.6  Discussion and Implications 
Several assumptions in the analytical model are critical in derive the results. In 
this section, I will first discuss how the results will be affected by these assumptions. 
I will then provide managerial implications of the results. 
The assumption of uniform distribution of job value does not affect the vendor’s 
decision to provide spot-price services. It however may affect clients’ job submission 
behavior. To see this, we need to consider the possibility that the vendor limits re-
sources capacity associated with the reserved services contracts. I assume zero mar-
ginal services-provision cost. I then derive Lemma 1 which states that the vendor is 
best not to limit the resources capacity of the reserved services contract. Without the 
assumption of zero marginal services-provision cost, however, this assertion no long-
er holds. The vendor will limit the resources capacity associated with the reserved 
services contracts. Clients who purchase the reserved services contract will also need 
to use spot-price services. So, rationale clients will use reserved services to secure as 
high job value as possible. This is done through a job submission strategy based on a 
threshold job value v0: only jobs with value higher than v0 run with reserved services 
and the rest run with spot-price services. The threshold job value v0 is affected by the 
distribution of job value.  
The distribution of job value does not affect vendor’s decision on hybrid pricing 
and its profit, even when different distributions of job value are considered. This is 
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because of the assumptions of zero marginal service-provision cost and exogenous 
spot prices. These assumptions relax the vendor from selecting a proper resources ca-
pacity for the reserved services contracts, and enable the vendor to only consider cli-
ents’ expected job value when it prices the reserved services contract. If the model 
endogenizes spot prices to make the vendor control them, the vendor’s decision on 
the spot prices has to depend on v0, which represents clients’ highest willingness to 
pay for the jobs run with spot-price services. In this case, whether the vendor can gain 
higher profit through limiting resources capacity of the reserved services contracts is 
not definite. 
By providing spot-price on-demand services, the vendor gains flexibility in allo-
cating the resources even when clients are using them. This is a big advantage of the 
vendor that improves the efficiency in resources allocation. This is similar to the 
common practices in airline industry where airline companies use a centralized reser-
vation system to control the availability of some fare classes based on rules that con-
sider time to departure, seat inventory, origin/destination control, and flight legs, 
which is in accordance to the best practices suggested by works in revenue yield 
management (Boyd and Bilegan 2003). 
The findings in this research have several managerial implications for cloud com-
puting services vendors. The first implication is related to quality differentiation and 
price discrimination. Quality differentiation is optimal for vendors if the difference in 
variable costs to support different quality levels is low (Varian 1997). A vendor may 
first produce a superior service, but later disable some functionality without affecting 
its usability to offer a lower-priced inferior service together with the superior one. 
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This is the classical damaged goods strategy, for example, represented by how Intel 
sells its computer chips. This strategy is preferred when it costs more to produce dif-
ferent quality levels than to restrict the functionality of the superior services, and will 
permit clients to self-select what suits them best (Deneckere and McAfee 1996). This 
strategy seems to be valid for cloud computing services too. Clients will use the supe-
rior services for high-value jobs and the inferior services for low-value jobs. The ven-
dor will need to be careful though: pricing the superior services too high or the inferi-
or services too low will reduce their profitability.  
Spot-price on-demand services are subject to services interruption risk. This will 
diminish the valuation that clients put on such services. They are damaged services in 
the IT services context. I call the provision of spot-price services that are subject to 
services interruption damaged services strategy. The probability of services interrup-
tion is essentially a quality differentiator. The findings of this study suggest that the 
vendor should not minimize the probability of services interruptions. This indicates 
that, even when the vendor has extra resources and it incurs zero cost to serve addi-
tional clients, it is better off to hold back some resources from spot-price services. It 
is an approach the vendor can use to control the services interruption risk, which af-
fect clients’ expectation of quality of the spot-price services. This somewhat paradox-
ically runs against the grain of the customer service focus in services management. 
We have seen that when clients are sensitive to services interruption, achieving low 
interruption levels may not be worthwhile. With a non-monopoly market structure, a 
competitor’s pressure is likely to make it necessary for the cloud computing services 
vendor to configure a low level of services interruption risk. A cloud computing ser-
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vices vendor can learn from the findings of this research, but will still need to be cau-
tious since few are monopolists with respect to the spectrum of their services offering. 
They may not be monopolists for very long in a market that rewards IT services inno-
vation. 
A third implication is that the hybrid pricing strategy with services interruption as 
a quality differentiator may benefit vendors only when their clients are sensitive to 
services interruptions, or spot prices are relatively high compared to the value of the 
clients’ jobs. These two conditions seem contradictory because clients will not be 
willing to pay a high price for spot-price services when they are highly sensitive to 
services interruption. In this circumstance, they will find fixed-price reserved services 
more attractive compared to spot-price on-demand services. This will trivialize the 
cannibalization effect caused by introducing spot-price services to the market. The 
nature of computing jobs that run with cloud computing services will affect clients’ 
risk sensitivity to services interruption.  
For example, businesses that are built on cloud computing services will require 
some level of continuity in the computing resources. They will encounter serious op-
erational problems if their cloud services instances are interrupted. Clients who con-
duct scientific computing jobs, however, will care more about their budget and prob-
ably have flexible completion time requirements. They will be less sensitive to ser-
vices interruptions than business clients. So the hybrid pricing strategy may work 
well where a majority of clients have similar preferences for the continuity of their 
services. Otherwise, it will not necessarily result in greater profitability for the vendor. 
The second and third implication show how and when the cloud services vendor 
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benefits from providing the spot-price interruptible services. To manage the interrup-
tion risk is important. The services interruption risk should generally increase with 
clients’ sensitivity to the interruptions. Based on the numerical investigations present-
ed in Section 3.4, a rule of thumb is to configure the services interruption risk be-
tween 0.2 and 0.25. I derive rule, however, based on the assumption of clients being 
homogeneous in their sensitivity to services interruptions. If we consider a more real-
istic scenario where clients are heterogeneous in this aspect, only the clients with high 
demand and high sensitivity to services interruptions will purchase the reserved ser-
vices contract, and these with low sensitivity to services interruptions, no matter their 
demand are high or low, will use spot-price services. In this case, the market segmen-
tation changes, and fewer clients will purchase the reserved services contract. There-
fore, the vendor should configure an even higher services interruption risk. 
I have discussed the managerial implications of the services interruption risk as-
sociated with spot-price services, treating it as a quality differentiator. It is critical in 
the damaged services strategy. The services interruption, however, is more than a 
quality differentiator. It also enables the cloud services vendor to control its inventory 
of compute resources to gain higher profit. For example airline industry has practiced 
seats inventory control: they will open some fare classes at certain time and close 
them after a time period controlled by a central reservation system. (Williamson 1992, 
Boyd and Bilegan 2003). For example budget airlines often offer zero priced tickets 
for travels during off-peak seasons, and provide tickets with big discount for multi-
journey flights during peak seasons. Similar practice can be found in hotels where 
hotel managers control room inventory to provide different room-type and price-
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category during peak and off-peak seasons to maximize revenue (Relihan III 1989). 
Following the first two implications, the findings of this research also have impli-
cations for how a cloud service vendor can use capacity, together with the appropriate 
pricing strategy, as a tool to improve profit. I have discussed this and used a numeri-
cal example to illustrate the efficacy of a capacity limit for the reserved-services con-
tract in improving the vendor’s profit. The key is to let the vendor ration its high-
quality services to clients with high demand and to let these clients use their limited 
reserved capacity for high-value jobs and use spot-price services for the rest of their 
jobs. Vendors will get more surplus from clients with high demand, and such profit 
gains will be at the expense of consumer surplus and overall social welfare. This is 
because more jobs will be run with spot-price services, facing the risk of services in-
terruption and leading to loss in consumer surplus and social welfare.  
A final implication relates to how to manage service interruption risk from the 
vendor’s perspective. It is critical to the effectiveness of the hybrid pricing strategy 
that clients perceive quality difference between the fixed-price reserved services and 
the spot-price on-demand services. Only when clients perceive the quality difference 
between these two types of services, the vendor can charge the reserved services a 
high price, so that it can reduce the cannibalization effect by the spot-price services 
yet maintain a high profit from the fixed-price reserved services. In practice, clients 
are unaware of the potential losses associated with interruptions. They also may not 
know how to estimate their likelihood. Although Amazon makes available historical 
spot prices for EC2 spot-price instances for the past 90 days, it may not be enough 
information for the client to manage its risk effectively. So many clients are likely to 
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over-estimate the risk of services interruption, and will perceive a low value for spot-
price services. As a result, the vendor will likely enjoy less profit. To ameliorate such 
impacts on profitability, a forward-looking vendor may wish to act as a risk manage-
ment infomediary for IT services with respect to its outcomes. Or an outsider can take 
this role, just like the travel agents in the airline industry and hospitality industry that 
facilitate the booking of air flight tickets and hotel rooms. Similar uncertainty issue 
arises when a client uses spot-price services. I will discuss related issues, including 
the characteristics of the uncertainty associated with the use of spot-price services, 
whether a client can gain sufficient information to eliminate the uncertainty, and how 
will the uncertainty affect clients’ valuation of the spot-price services, in the next 
chapter.  
3.7  Conclusion 
This research analyzes a monopolist’s pricing strategy for cloud computing ser-
vices. Using hybrid pricing, the vendor takes services interruption as a quality differ-
entiator to offer two types of services to the market: fixed-price reserved services and 
spot-price on-demand services. The latter is associated with a certain level of services 
interruption risk and will be viewed as lower-value services. The use of hybrid pric-
ing in the cloud computing services market is novel. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first study to analyze its economic impact and to offer practical pricing 
strategy recommendations to cloud vendors. This research shows that, only when (1) 
clients are highly sensitive to service interruptions or (2) the expected spot price is 
high relative to the value of clients’ jobs, should the vendor employ the hybrid pricing 
strategy. It will lead to lower consumer surplus and lower social welfare in most cas-
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es. On the other hand, the results also show that the vendor is able to increase its prof-
it by keeping the services interruption risk at a high level, so that the cannibalization 
effect between fixed-price reserved services and spot-price on-demand services will 
be minimized.  
This work is subject to several limitations. In the current model, spot prices for 
on-demand services are assumed to only have two exogenous values (high and low), 
and the vendor decides the probability of each value to occur. This, in turn, deter-
mines the level of service interruption.  In business, spot prices will be dynamically 
determined by real-time supply and demand. The cloud services vendor will be able 
to collect its clients’ price bids and set spot prices appropriately. This decision-
making problem for the vendor is not analyzed here. Moreover, clients cannot delay 
the submission of jobs.  
I also do not consider whether two spot prices are incentive-compatible. When the 
client can delay job submissions, it will evaluate a job runs with spot-price services at 
different price levels, and submit the job if the current spot-price yields the highest 
net utility, or wait until the spot-price level changes. An incentive-compatible pair of 
spot prices will induce the client to separate job arrivals according to their value, and 
submit high-value jobs when spot prices are at a high level and low-value jobs when 
spot prices are at a low level. This will change the client’s overall expected utility 
from spot-price services, which will affect its willingness-to-pay for the reserved ser-
vices contract as well.  
In addition, the arrival of jobs is assumed to be independent and identical over all 
of the periods. In reality, however, job arrivals are not the same across different peri-
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ods. Clients will experience peak and non-peak job-arrival periods, and therefore their 
decisions will be more complicated. Despite these simplifying assumptions, my mod-
el is able to capture the key features of hybrid pricing strategy in the cloud computing 
services market, and offers meaningful recommendations to the vendor. 
Furthermore, I implicitly assume that all clients are well informed about the ser-
vices interruption risk. Therefore they are able to perceive the quality difference be-
tween the fixed-price and spot-price services. This is not always true in reality. Cli-
ents may over- or under-estimate the services interruption risk associated with the 
spot-price services. This may lead to ineffectiveness of the hybrid pricing strategy. To 
avoid this, the vendor should help clients perceive the quality difference between 
fixed-price and spot-price services. For example, the vendor can provide risk-analysis 
support to clients to eliminate biases in their assessment of the services interruption 
risk. 
The limitations suggest directions to extend the analytical model towards a more 
general and realistic setting. For example, it is possible to relax the assumption of ex-
ogenous spot prices. Another possibility is to allow the job-arrival rate to vary over 
time. By studying the interactions between IT services vendors and clients, I expect to 
understand the cloud computing services market more fully and make more meaning-
ful managerial recommendations. 
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4  An Experimental Study of a Compound Pricing Mechanism for 
Brokered Cloud Services  
The prior chapter discussed a cloud services vendor’s decision about offering 
fixed-price reserved services or spot-price on-demand cloud computing services. The 
analysis was based on a model assuming that all clients are aware of the risk of ser-
vices interruption associated with the spot-price services. They also can calculate the 
level of this risk. The simplifying assumption in the analytic model that spot prices 
take only two values, which is necessary to get insights on the problem setting while 
not making the model too complicated to analyze, is not too unrealistic. 
In reality, taking Amazon EC2 spot prices as an example, there are multiple price 
levels and predicting the spot price that will occur 5 minutes later is a burden for cli-
ents. In fact, clients can hardly predict whether and when their jobs run, when spot-
price services will be interrupted. This will leave the clients in an uncomfortable situ-
ation, but a new opportunity for business is available. Services that can help clients 
eliminate the uncertainty associated with the spot-price services will create value for 
clients. How clients value such services and what factors will affect their valuation, 
however, are worth investigating before the real business initiatives taking place. This 
chapter will present an experimental study that addresses these issues. 
4.1  Introduction 
Different approaches to the pricing and sale of cloud computing services have 
evolved over the years. Vendors have sold computing and storage services with fixed 
prices when their clients need them. This has been called the on-demand model. I will 
refer to it as the fixed-price model to emphasize the role that prices play in cloud 
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computing. In December 2009, Amazon.com launched demand-driven dynamic pric-
ing as an alternative (Higginbotham 2009). This approach has come be known as the 
spot-price model, and changes in market prices are reflected for jobs running as spot-
price instances. Under this mechanism, a client’s access to a specific instance of a 
computing resource depends on its bid price, the maximum price per unit of services 
that the client is willing to pay. Changing vendor services supply and clients demand 
jointly decide spot prices in the market over time.  
Even though the spot-price model has been attractive to clients that wish to avoid 
over-paying for services under the fixed-price model, my ongoing observations in a 
field study of cloud computing services during the past several years suggest that spot 
prices can be volatile. One example is the market’s experience with Amazon.com's 
spot prices during 2011, on the basis of one type of instance – the m2.2xlarge in-
stance from the eastern region of the United States.  As reported by the Cloud Ex-
change (defunct) (Brandon 2011), the price of this instance type rose precipitously to 
US$999.99 for a two-hour period on September 26, 2011 from US$0.44 per hour on 
average. This caused most jobs that were being processed at that time to be interrupt-
ed, since few clients previously indicated such a high reservation price.  
Although such prices are not typical, a number of questions arise: (1) How im-
portant is it to avoid the interruption of services? (2) How much should a client be 
willing to pay to obtain a services guarantee? (3) How will client willingness-to-pay 
be affected when the market demand leads to a relative shortage of supply of cloud 
computing services and escalates prices in the short term, but the historical trends in 
longer term are known? In particular, clients differ in their abilities to interpret and 
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predict the short-term price fluctuations. This will cause clients to assess the business 
value of their jobs and to identify an appropriate bid price for the services they need, 
as services with a job completion guarantee, when market demand and spot prices 
change.  
Digital intermediaries provide well-known capabilities to mitigate the risks that 
arise around the exchange of products and services with buyers and sellers in market 
settings (Malone et al. 1987). This is true in financial markets for stocks, bonds, 
commodities and foreign exchange, and in the markets for TV and radio broadcasting 
bandwidth, among other settings. Similar opportunities exist in the market for IT ser-
vices, where there is a need for price discovery, vendor and client matching, the crea-
tion of stakeholder informedness, the diminution of related transactions and opera-
tions costs, and risks of exchange.  
Cloud computing services brokers are natural intermediaries to mitigate the risks 
of exchange and support improvements in the quality of markets for IT services 
(Jackson 2012). They can aggregate resources to lower the risk of a client’s sudden 
loss of services, and customize services to address different client needs (Gartner 
2011). This is similar to how wealth management services brokers support the varied 
investment needs of high net worth clients – a term commonly used in the financial 
sector, referring to those having high investable financial assets excluding their pri-
mary residence. This includes, for example, clients with financial assets in excess of 
US$1 million. Multiple financial institutions may have limited services or services 
delivery capabilities to address the full spectrum of client needs. In addition, research 
works have been conducted to improve the efficiency of resources allocation in virtu-
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alized computing environment, including consolidation of virtual instances, better 
planning and more efficient management of capacity of the virtualized data centers 
(Speitkamp and Bichler 2010, Aedagna et al. 2013, Ghosh et al. 2013, Kesavan et al. 
2013). Some brokered services vendors may wish to design, build and offer their own 
complementary services to further mitigate the negative effects of services interrup-
tion. For example, PiCloud (www.picloud.com), a cloud services broker, leverages 
Amazon.com’s spot services to implement a pool of job queues to deliver services 
faster than typical infrastructure services while reducing costs for its clients. It re-
quires clients to use a specific programming language to interact with the cloud plat-
form. Then, in case of services interruption, the vendor’s cloud platform can take over 
the interrupted job and restart it autonomously. 
The major concerns these cloud services brokers address are related to the contin-
uous availability of cloud services and management of computing resources from 
several different cloud services vendors. There have been very limited attempts, how-
ever, to investigate the differences among clients that affect their economic behavior. 
This will allow efficient cloud computing brokerage services and resources allocation 
mechanisms to be designed for them. 
This research proposes a compound pricing mechanism that is flexible and em-
phasizes clients’ concerns about the risks associated with cloud computing services. 
In the proposed mechanism, the vendor, as a risk-mitigating digital intermediary, of-
fers spot-price services that are configurable by the client to address its resource re-
quirements, deadlines and performance constraints, the price it will pay, and the com-
pensation it will receive if the vendor fails to perform. The vendor, by the same token, 
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will have the desired flexibility to evaluate and accept or reject bids from clients. This 
is a risk-based value exchange between the vendor and its client, performed in a way 
that indemnifies the client against financial losses that may arise when job completion 
deadlines are not met due to services interruption. 
For the proposed mechanism design to be viable, assessing clients’ willingness-
to-pay for services based on the related job duration risk, client risk informedness and 
client risk characteristics is necessary, along with the different prices they must pay. 
But how will these factors affect a client’s willingness-to-pay for cloud computing 
services that include a job completion guarantee? This study uses a web-based exper-
imental testbed to carry out an empirical study to supply the answers.  
The results in this study show that client risk informedness and client risk aver-
sion affect their willingness-to-pay for the services that are offered through the exper-
imental testbed. Understanding the interaction between client risk informedness and 
client risk aversion is useful for the brokered services vendor. This is especially true 
for clients with a higher level of risk aversion: when they have a better knowledge of 
the job completion risk, they will exhibit a lower level of willingness-to-pay for bro-
kered cloud computing services that are supplied using the compound pricing mecha-
nism. Clients who are less risk-averse are less likely to value services with guaranteed 
job completion. These results suggest that the cloud vendor or broker should be stra-
tegic in affecting client risk informedness. This research contributes to the literature 
on cloud computing by proposing a novel mechanism design for brokered cloud com-
puting services using the compound pricing mechanism. 
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4.2  Literature and Development of Hypotheses 
The brokered cloud services that this research proposes are additional offering to 
the fixed-price and spot-price cloud services already available in the market. Fixed-
price reserved services set aside cloud computing resources for clients, and guarantee 
job completion. Spot-price services do not provide such job-completion guarantees. 
There will be a loss of efficiency because clients who need a moderate level of job-
completion guarantee and have moderate capabilities to deal with the lack of a guar-
antee may stay out of the market. To gauge the economic potential of brokered cloud 
services, it is important to know how much clients are willing to pay for the brokered 
services and how client willingness-to-pay will be different in the presence of several 
key variables. 
Many methods have been developed to measure client willingness-to-pay, either 
directly or indirectly, in marketing literature. See Miller et al. (2011) for a compre-
hensive review. This study uses a direct approach. The focus of this research, howev-
er, is not on how to measure client willingness-to-pay; I am more interested in the 
factors that potentially will affect client willingness-to-pay, and are unique and prom-
inent in the context of cloud computing. One such unique factor is services interrup-
tion-related issues created when spot-price services are provided. 
A client’s willingness-to-pay for a product is essentially its estimate of the value 
of that product. When evaluating the value of the product, clients tend to have a bias 
toward the estimate that is initially given to them (Tversky 1974). In the context of 
cloud computing, fixed and spot prices act as reference points. To estimate a client’s 
willingness-to-pay involves a comparison between these prices. The subsequent esti-
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mates will be biased toward the price that is preferred by clients. Clients seek the 
lowest prices in the market; so, spot prices will be the main reference point, on which 
a client can place decision weights to represent its willingness-to-pay (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979), and the fixed price will be the upper bound of the client’s willingness-
to-pay. In addition, because spot-price services are subject to unexpected services in-
terruption, a client’s willingness-to-pay can be viewed in terms of certainty equiva-
lents relative to the financial losses that may arise when services become unavailable 
to the client.  
Expected utility theory, discussed by Fishburn (1988), suggests that the certainty 
equivalent of an asset with an uncertain outcome should be calculated by a weighted 
sum of all possible outcomes, based on their probability of occurrence. There is much 
controversial evidence regarding the axioms of utility theory, however. As a result, 
alternative theories, such as prospect theory and subjective expected utility theory—
which suggest the weights to be associated with potential outcomes should be based 
on, but different from, their probabilities—have been proposed to explain clients’ de-
cision-making amid uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Therefore, to under-
stand a client’s willingness-to-pay for brokered cloud services, we need to know (1) 
the probability of spot-price services interruption, and (2) how a client adjusts its 
weights in decision-making based on the probabilities. 
I will focus on variables that affect a client’s perception of risk and willingness-
to-pay (see Figure 4.1), and offer several related hypotheses. 
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Figure 4.1 Research model 
 
Job duration and completion risk. A client’s willingness-to-pay for cloud com-
puting services will vary based on the purposes to which they are put: for example, 
running a two-hour computing-intensive scientific simulation, or hosting an e-
commerce website will be valued differently.  
To get a sense of the empirical regularities of spot-price cloud computing services, 
I obtained time-series data on prices from the Amazon Elastic Computing Cloud for 
the period from January 31, 2012 to January 31, 2013. (See the Appendix C1.) I 
found that the number of services interruptions was positively associated with job 
completion duration. In the literature on risk and uncertainty, Krupnick et al. (2002) 
found that clients were willing to pay to reduce their risk of mortality, and their will-
ingness-to-pay increased with the magnitude of the likely reduction. People also pur-
chase insurance products to hedge against unexpected financial losses. Similarly, ex-
perimental jobs with a higher interruption risk should induce clients to pay more in 
order to eliminate the risk. In addition, the compound pricing mechanism provides 
guaranteed job completion at a price, including a compensation scheme, and this will 
ensure a client against financial losses due to unexpected services interruptions. This 
should influence the client’s willingness-to-pay for such services when the interrup-
Job Duration 
Client’s Aversion to Risk 
Client’s Risk Informedness 
of Spot Market 
Client’s Willingness-to-
Pay for compound Pric-
ing 
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tion risk it faces is high: 
• Hypothesis 1 (Job Duration and Completion Risk): Client willingness-to-
pay for cloud computing services with a job-completion guarantee provided 
under the proposed compound pricing mechanism will be higher for jobs of 
longer duration that are more subject to job-completion risk. 
Economic theory supports this hypothesis. Utility theory suggests that a client will 
pay a price premium for protection against risk. Risk in the cloud computing services 
setting arises due to the possibility of services interruption when jobs run with spot-
price services. Decision-makers often weigh outcomes differently from their probabil-
ities. In addition, decision-makers often over-estimate or under-estimate the proba-
bilities associated with risky outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and this bias 
typically is consistent across different kinds of risks (Schoemaker 1993).  
Client risk aversion. Decision-makers typically prefer certain outcomes to am-
biguous ones (Schmidt et al. 2008). Cloud computing services that involve spot-price 
services with guaranteed job completion generally will be preferred to spot-price ser-
vices without guarantees. This is due to client risk aversion. As a result, the client will 
be willing to pay a higher price for the guaranteed completion of a job, subject to its 
risk aversion for financial losses. This suggests: 
• Hypothesis 2 (Client Risk Aversion): Clients who are more risk-averse will 
have a higher willingness-to-pay for cloud computing services with a job-
completion guarantee provided under the proposed compound pricing mecha-
nism. 
A decision-maker’s sensitivity to risk is influenced by situational factors, such as 
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the manner of presentations of different possible outcomes (Slovic 1972b). The situa-
tional factors affect the cognitive effort that a decision-maker has to put into assessing 
the risk. Therefore, to examine the effect of a decision-maker’s risk aversion on its 
decision-making, the influence of situational effects should be controlled. Prior exper-
imental research has explored the relationship between different bidder types defined 
by their aversion to risk and their bidding behavior in a controlled laboratory experi-
ment (Bapna et al. 2010). More specifically, decision-makers who are risk-averse 
tend to favor certain outcomes more than those who are risk-seeking (Schoemaker 
1993). On the other hand, clients as decision-makers tend to over-estimate the proba-
bility of losses even though the actual probabilities are small (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). The bias of estimating uncertain outcomes with small probabilities tends to be 
moderated by the decision-maker’s attitude toward risk. Decision-makers who are 
more risk-averse perceive a higher probability of loss than those who are less risk-
averse, although both estimates are likely to be higher than the actual probability. 
Therefore, no matter whether expected utility theory or prospect theory describes a 
client’s utility more appropriately, the effect of a client’s risk aversion on its willing-
ness-to-pay should be consistent. 
Client risk informedness. When consumers are not fully informed about the 
quality or performance of a product or service, they apply an uncertainty discount (Li 
et al. 2013), which diminishes their willingness-to-pay (Clemons and Gao 2008, Mar-
kopoulos and Clemons 2013). This applies to client informedness and willingness-to-
pay in cloud computing services too. A greater level of informedness will lower a cli-
ent’s uncertainty discount for the value of the services. Historical information on spot 
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prices may influence a client’s perception of the need for purchasing services that in-
clude guaranteed job completion. Sharing critical information that shows the client 
the job-completion risk, based on the increased likelihood of jobs with longer dura-
tions not reaching completion, will help to inform the client, for example. This leads 
to: 
• Hypothesis 3 (Client Risk Informedness): Clients with a lower level of risk 
informedness about their jobs will have a higher level of willingness-to-pay 
for cloud computing services with a job-completion guarantee provided under 
the proposed compound pricing mechanism. 
In the context of this research, the probabilistic services interruption is the major 
source of client uncertainty about spot-price services. Risk informedness determines 
to what extent a client’s assessment of the certainty equivalent of the financial losses 
due to services interruption will be accurate. Bear in mind that spot prices usually 
fluctuate around a base price, and services interruption only happen when spot prices 
rise to higher levels. So clients with limited risk informedness will likely get esti-
mates that deviate more from the base spot price than clients who are more informed. 
So clients with limited risk informedness should be willing to pay a higher price for 
protection against services interruption. 
4.3  The Experiment 
A vast body of literature in economics suggests that clients may be uncertain 
about product performance, and also their preference structures (Urbany et al. 1989, 
Gregory et al. 1993, Wang et al. 2007). In this experimental research, client uncer-
tainty about preference structure is controlled for by giving explicit instructions on 
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the goals and performance measures in the experiment so that price changes for spot-
price services and the completion status of jobs run with spot-price services are the 
only sources of uncertainty. Real-world spot-price data represent price changes for 
the hypothetical spot-price services in the experiment. It also involves the manipula-
tion of the level of uncertainty associated with spot-price services by providing sub-
jects with different information about the uncertain aspects of the services. 
Two pilot sessions occurred before the formal experiments. The first was done in 
November 2012. Six full-time employees in a Singapore-based high-tech research 
institution participated. Based on the feedbacks, I simplified the testbed’s interface 
and then conducted a second pilot session in December 2012. Eight post-graduate 
students from IT-related majors participated. They commented that the calculations of 
the costs and benefits were complicated and difficult. This motivated me to further 
refine the design of the experimental jobs and improve their descriptions. 
After the two rounds of pilot sessions and a series of refinements of the testbed in-
terface, experiment instructions, and experimental job descriptions, I conducted the 
experimental sessions in February 2013. Working professionals from a Singapore-
based public research institution that focuses on science and technology research 
formed the subject pool. The participants were knowledgeable about business analyt-
ics and IT services, a requirement for their involvement. Participants received S$20 
for joining the experiment, plus a performance-based bonus that ranged from S$10 to 
S$50 to induce rational economic decision-making (Smith 1976). During the study 
period, S$1 was about US$0.80. 45 subjects completed the experimental procedure. 
They had a mean age of 34 years, and 71% were male. Their levels of experience 
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confirmed that no participants had truly expert-level knowledge, but nor did they lack 
domain knowledge or managerial decision-making experience. (See Figure 4.2.) 
Figure 4.2 Experimental design 
  Job duration 
  Three hours Five hours Ten hours 
Risk 
informedness 
Low 21 subjects 
High 24 subjects 
Note: Job duration is a within-subjects design variable. Subjects all were assigned the same set of 
three computing jobs with a duration of 3, 5, and 10 hours. 
Experimental set-up 
Services interruption risk was increasing in the duration of the jobs that ran with 
spot-price services. I manipulated job duration was configured as a within-subjects 
variable. Different job durations induced different level of services interruption risk. 
Subjects all were assigned the same set of three computing jobs with three, five, and 
ten hours duration. A subject’s risk aversion was measured after all the experimental 
sessions were completed, as way of minimizing the subject expectancy effect, using a 
questionnaire adapted from Weber et al. (2002). (See Appendix C2.) Risk informed-
ness was manipulated using two randomized between-subject conditions. In the low 
risk-informedness condition, subjects were provided with historical spot services 
price information, which matches the kind of information supplied in the spot-price, 
on-demand cloud computing services market. In the high risk-informedness condition, 
subjects were given additional risk analysis support, beyond historical spot price in-
formation, to help them evaluate the costs and benefits of different cloud computing 
services. 
 
 78 
  
Implementation of the experimental testbed 
This research involved the design of a website called SmarterCloud 
(www.smarter-cloud.biz) to represent a cloud computing services vendor and its 
compound pricing mechanism for the services offerings. The testbed was implement-
ed with Python on the Google App Engine platform-as-a-service. (See Figure 4.3.) 
The site allows clients to compare and purchase cloud computing services in the fol-
lowing way. For the purchase of fixed-price services, all subjects had access to job 
cost information. For spot-price services, statistics on hypothetical purchases were 
derived from a simulation of experimental jobs with real historical spot prices. Sub-
jects received them based on their assignment to different treatment groups. For a de-
scription of the simulation, see the Appendix C1. For cloud computing services with 
guaranteed job completion, the vendor offers the client compensation if there is a 
problem, but the client must pay for the guarantee. This involves a simple best-offer 
algorithm with a termination rule over two rounds at the most in which the participant 
makes a bid for the job. The experimental vendor is programmed to reject the first bid, 
and then will use the bid in second round to assess a subject’s willingness-to-pay.  
I treat job duration as a within-subjects variable. Subjects were all assigned the 
same set of three computing jobs of a duration of 3, 5, and 10 hours. A subject’s risk 
aversion was measured after all the experimental sessions were completed, as a way 
of minimizing the subject expectancy effect, using a questionnaire following Weber 
et al. (2002). Risk informedness was operationalized using two randomized between-
subject conditions. In the low risk-informedness condition, subjects were provided 
with historical price information on spot-price services, which matched the infor-
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mation supplied in the spot-price, on-demand cloud computing services market. In the 
high risk-informedness treatment condition, subjects received additional risk analysis 
support, in addition to the historical spot-price information, to help them evaluate the 
costs and benefits of different cloud computing services. (See Table 4.1.) 
Figure 4.3 Experimental testbed: SmarterCloud (www.smarter-cloud.biz) 
a. Historical spot price shown to participants without risk analysis support 
 
b. Transaction interface through which subjects make offers to SmarterCloud 
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Experimental jobs, measurement of job performance and willingness-to-pay  
Subjects were told to run a series of simulation jobs with cloud computing ser-
vices of three different durations: 3, 5, and 10 hours. This parameter setting conforms 
to typical jobs in the real world data centers, where 99% of scientific computing tasks 
have durations of less than ten hours (Iosup et al. 2008). The deadline for completing 
the simulation results was 24 hours.  
To ensure that subjects established a perceived cost for spot-price cloud compu-
ting services, their performance was evaluated according to the following rules. If a 
subject made a successful offer to use the services, his or her performance would be 
calculated based on the amount of profit generated from the jobs, less the payment 
required for guaranteed job completion. If a request for the services were unsuccess-
ful, then the subjects would have to use spot-price services to execute the jobs.  
This was operationalized by randomly generating jobs ran with spot-price services 
and using their associated completion and revenue outcomes. The subject’s perfor-
mance on each job was calculated based on the amount of profit generated from the 
execution, less the payment required for spot-price, on-demand services. When a job 
running with spot-price services was completed, the firm’s revenue was S$1,000. 
When the job was not completed in time, the revenue was prorated based on the com-
pleted percentage of the interrupted job, plus a S$200 penalty. 
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Table 4.1 Risk analysis support for the high risk-informedness condition 
 Job completed? Occurrence 
Total  
payment 
Expected 
profit 
On-demand 
Yes 100.0% S$240.00 
(S$0.80 × 300) 
S$760.00 
No     0.0% -- -- 
Spot price-based 
historical purchases 
Yes   98.9% S$87.74 S$912.26 
No     1.1% -- S$184.44 
Notes: Historical purchase information was available to subjects in the baseline and treatment 
conditions; similar information for spot-price services was available only to subjects in the 
related treatment condition. 
Experimental procedure 
When subjects came to participate in the experiment, they logged onto the 
SmarterCloud website and were randomly assigned to one of the two risk-
informedness conditions: high or low. Each subject read and signed an informed con-
sent form, read the instructions, and took a quiz to test if he or she had a good under-
standing of the purpose and procedures of the experiment. Each subject then pur-
chased cloud computing services to run three jobs. For each job, a subject was re-
quired to initially submit the maximum price that he or she was willing to pay for the 
services, and then to update the price in a second round of bidding. After the experi-
mental session, the subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire to provide feed-
back on their experience with the experimental testbed. Another questionnaire was 
distributed one week later to assess each participant’s risk aversion. (See Appendix 
C2.) The delay in the distribution of the second questionnaire was to minimize the 
subject expectancy effect. 
I conduct a number of control checks.  The results suggest that the subjects’ ages, 
experience levels and risk aversion did not differ between the baseline and treatment 
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conditions. Nor did I obtain evidence through regression analysis that risk aversion 
differed as a function of presenting or withholding risk analysis support to subjects. 
This allowed me to examine risk aversion as a stable predictor of a subject’s propen-
sity to take risks. 
4.4  Data Analysis and Results 
Control Check 
The control variables need to be assessed to find out whether participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two experiment groups. Table 4.2 provides descrip-
tive statistics on participants’ demographic information. The results of the check of 
the control variables suggest that participants’ risk propensity, age, and experiences 
did not differ between the baseline group and the treatment group, confirming that the 
randomization is effective. 
Table 4.2 Characteristics of subjects (N = 54) 
 
Mean 
(Std. Deviation) p-Value (Between-
Group) Control Group 
Treatment 
Group All 
Risk propensity -0.57 (8.10) 
0.62 
(9.10) 
0.07 
(8.56) 0.645 
Age 33.86 (6.18) 
34.88 
(6.20) 
34.40 
(6.14) 0.585 
Working experience 2.52 (1.17) 
2.96 
(1.33) 
2.76 
(1.26) 0.255 
Decision-making experience 1.33 (0.66) 
1.54 
(0.78) 
1.44 
(0.73) 0.342 
Cloud services usage 1.76 (0.77) 
1.83 
(0.92) 
1.80 
(0.84) 0.780 
Negotiation experience 1.76 (0.77) 
2.25 
(1.11) 
2.02 
(0.99) 0.099 
Analytics experience 1.19 (0.40) 
1.33 
(0.76) 
1.27 
(0.62) 0.445 
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Hypotheses Testing 
To test the Job Duration and Completion Risk Hypothesis (H1), I conducted a re-
peated measures analysis of variance. There is no significant effect of job duration on 
client willingness-to-pay (F(1.71, 73.47) = 1.53, p = 0.23).1 For robustness check, I 
also tested the effect of job duration on client willingness-to-pay in sub-groups, and 
obtained similar results for both the baseline group (F(1.56, 31.21) = 0.664, p = 0.486) 
and treatment group (F(2, 46) = 2.85, p = 0.068). So H1 is not supported. A plausible 
reason is that the range of job durations in the experimental setup was insufficient for 
subjects to consider them as being different. 
To explore this possibility, it made sense to conduct a post hoc analysis to exam-
ine the impact of job duration in cost terms. In this analysis, the unit cost for spot-
price services for the three experimental jobs was computed. The aim was to find out 
whether there were perceivable differences between the unit costs. Based on the risk 
analysis information in the experiment, the unit cost for spot-price services of a single 
experimental job was calculated by dividing the expected total cost, including both 
successful and unsuccessful cases, by the number of instances required and job dura-
tion in hours. A client’s unit costs for spot-price services are S$0.315, S$0.310 and 
S$0.306 for job durations of 3, 5 and 10 hours. Subjects probably ignored the differ-
ences, since they were not sufficiently large to be meaningful.  
In addition, historical spot prices for cloud computing services are helpful for giv-
ing a sense of the frequency of their changes within a time period: for instance, 20 
                                                 
1 Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the data (χ2(2) = 
11.41, p = 0.003). I corrected the degrees of freedom using Huynh-Feldt’s estimates of sphe-
ricity (ε = 0.85) as a basis for these results. 
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price changes over 3 months or 100 prices changes in a year. This type of information 
is not helpful in assessing the interruption risk associated with a specific computing 
job though. Subjects may not be able to differentiate the risk levels associated with 
the three experimental jobs. They then may ignore the difference in job durations and 
not adjust their willingness-to-pay. 
I next assessed the Client Risk Aversion (H2) and the Client Risk Informedness 
(H3) Hypotheses. I conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, which suggests 
that risk informedness has a significant effect on willingness-to-pay for cloud compu-
ting services under the compound pricing mechanism (F = 7.41, p = 0.009). In addi-
tion, this effect was more pronounced in the high job-risk case (F = 14.48, p < 0.001) 
than in the low job-risk case (F = 4.44, p = 0.041).  
I further tested whether the effect of risk informedness is consistent in the high 
risk aversion and the low risk aversion groups. High risk aversion is defined in terms 
of a subject’s risk score being less than -4, which is the mean of the overall risk score 
minus one half of one standard deviation. Similarly, low risk aversion is defined in 
terms of a subject’s risk score being more than 4, which is the mean of the overall risk 
score plus one half of one standard deviation. Interestingly, the effect of risk in-
formedness is found significant in the high risk aversion group (F = 11.30, p = 0.001), 
but not in the low risk aversion group (F = 0.63, p = 0.432).  
The results suggest that the effect of risk informedness on client willingness-to-
pay is consistent and robust across different levels of job risk, but inconsistent among 
subjects with different levels of risk aversion. Subjects with low risk aversion are in-
different in their willingness-to-pay – with or without risk analysis support. The effect 
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of risk informedness may be dominated by the subjects’ inclination to pursue a higher 
profit, even though there is uncertainty. Alternatively, they simply may have ignored 
the additional information provided by the risk analysis support tool. 
I ran a regression to assess the marginal effects of risk aversion and risk in-
formedness, and found that the main effects and interaction effects were significant. 
(See Table 4.3.) Sub-sample analysis for cloud computing services jobs with low risk 
(durations of 5 hours) and high risk level (durations of 10 hours) showed that the 
main and interaction effects were significant. (See Table 4.3.) Interestingly, the coef-
ficient estimates for the effect of risk informedness suggest a greater impact when job 
risk is high than when job risk is low. These results indicate that subjects with high 
risk informedness may perceive larger differences in the level of risk associated with 
jobs of different durations than subjects with low risk informedness. The repeated 
measures test results further confirmed that there was no significant difference be-
tween client willingness-to-pay under different job durations. Hypotheses 2 and 3 
thus are supported. 
Table 4.3 Basic model with full sample, low and high job-risk groups 
Model variables Full sample Low job risk  
High 
job risk  
Risk informedness 
-0.305*** 
(0.025) 
-0.290** 
(0.042) 
-0.483*** 
(0.041) 
Risk aversion 
-0.453*** 
(0.002) 
-0.507** 
(0.004) 
-0.516** 
(0.004) 
Risk informedness × Risk aversion  0.301** 
(0.003) 
0.419* 
(0.005) 
0.357* 
(0.005) 
Adj.-R2 17.1% 14.0% 31.5% 
Note: Standard deviations are reported underneath the coefficient estimates. Coefficients are 
standardized. *** for p < 0.001, ** for p < 0.05, * for p < 0.1. 
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In order to remove the effect of subjects’ prior experience with (1) cloud compu-
ting services, (2) decisions made under uncertainty, and (3) analytical tasks, I con-
structed and tested an extended regression model. The extended model includes 
measures of subjects’ experience with working, business decision-making, business 
analytic tasks, business negotiation activities, and cloud computing services usage. 
The results are reported in Table 4.4. The interaction effect was weaker in the extend-
ed model. In addition, the results for the extended model with the low job-risk group 
only showed significant effects for risk aversion and negotiation experience. The 
goodness of fit of the extended model for the low job-risk group was worse, as indict-
ed by a smaller adj-R2 though. 
Table 4.4 Extended model with full sample, low and high job-risk groups 
Model variables Full sample Low job risk 
High 
job risk 
Risk informedness -0.256*** 
(0.027) 
-0.228 
(0.045) 
-0.399*** 
(0.042) 
Risk aversion 
-0.436*** 
(0.002) 
-0.491** 
(0.004) 
-0.581*** 
(0.004) 
Risk informedness × Risk aversion  0.220* 
(0.003) 
0.342 
(0.006) 
0.320 
(0.005) 
Working experience 
0.064 
(0.013) 
0.041 
(0.023) 
-0.096 
(0.021) 
Business decision-making experience 
0.018 
(0.024) 
0.027 
(0.040) 
-0.046 
(-0.038) 
Cloud usage experience 0.141 
(0.019) 
0.196 
(0.032) 
0.231 
(0.030) 
Business negotiation experience 
-0.219** 
(0.015) 
-0.306* 
(0.026) 
-0.176 
(0.024) 
Business analytics experience -0.099 
(0.027) 
-0.025 
(0.046) 
-0.170 
(0.043) 
Adj.-R2 18.2% 12.2% 34% 
Note: Standard deviations are reported underneath the coefficient estimates. Coefficients are 
standardized. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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To further examine the interaction effect between risk aversion and risk in-
formedness, I implemented a two-sample t-test and a simple slope analysis. The two-
sample t-test tests whether there were differences in the effect of risk informedness on 
client willingness-to-pay for subjects with low and high risk aversion. The simple 
slope analysis enabled me to make a visual representation of the interaction effect be-
tween risk aversion and risk informedness.  
The result of the two-sample t-test was significant at the 0.05 level (t = 3.50, p = 
0.001) for subjects with high risk aversion. In contrast, for subjects with low risk 
aversion (with a risk score greater than 4, and half of one standard deviation higher 
than the mean), the difference was not significant (t = 0.22, p = 0.83). I repeated the 
same test for all of the job duration conditions. (See Table 4.5.) No difference in cli-
ent willingness-to-pay was found for experimental Job 1. This may have been caused 
by the fact that subjects were still in the process of digesting the experimental infor-
mation and learning how to make an offer to the hypothetical cloud services vendor. 
The results for Job 2 and Job 3 were consistent. 
Table 4.5 Difference in effect of risk informedness on client willingness-to-pay in 
the presence of different levels of job risk and client risk aversion 
Subject group Job 1 (3 hours) 
Job 2 
(5 hours) 
Job 3 
(10 hours) 
Low risk aversion 
0.011 
(0.183) 
-0.008 
(0.146) 
0.030 
(0.135) 
High risk aversion 
0.132 
(0.188) 
0.160* 
(0.138) 
0.230** 
(0.155) 
Note: The difference between mean client willingness-to-pay in the baseline group and in the 
treatment group is reported. Standard deviations are reported in the parentheses. 
Signif. = *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Figure 4.4 shows the results of the simple slope analysis. It presents the interac-
tion effect between risk aversion and risk analysis support on the resulting level of 
client willingness-to-pay for the 5-hour jobs. A similar result is obtained for the 10-
hour jobs. The results offer empirical evidence for the Client Risk Informedness Hy-
pothesis (H3). More risk-averse clients with a lower level of risk-informedness are 
willing to pay more for cloud computing services with the job completion guarantee 
and compound pricing, based on their assessment of services interruption risk. With-
out a sufficient level of risk-informedness, clients will over-estimate the cost of using 
spot-price services, based on their downward bias for the expected value they ascribe 
to the outcome. Since the spot price will not drop below the base-level, this base-level 
price represents the certain part of the costs to the clients. Without the help of analyti-
cal tools to support rational decision-making, clients are likely to use biased heuristics 
and rules-of-thumb to estimate the costs associated with services interruption. As a 
result, some will have difficulty making confident cost estimates.  
Figure 4.4 Interaction effect between risk informedness and risk aversion 
 
I operationalized client risk-informedness based on whether subjects have access 
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Low Risk
Informedness
Condition
High Risk
Informedness
Condition
More risk averse Less risk averse 
W
ili
ng
ne
ss
-t
o-
pa
y 
 Low risk-
informedness 
condition 
High risk-
informedness 
condition 
 89 
  
to a risk analysis support tool. The tool helped them to achieve more accurate esti-
mates of the likelihood of services interruption. This reduced the effects of uncertain-
ty on their overall perceived costs. My approach was intended to improve the client’s 
level of risk informedness.  
According to the results of the post-experiment questionnaire, shown in Table 4.6, 
subjects from different treatment groups perceived no difference in the ease of use of 
the testbed, but subjects from the baseline group expressed a stronger intention to use 
the testbed again than subjects from the treatment group. These results indicate that 
although it is not difficult to use, the risk analysis support tool nevertheless intro-
duced a considerable amount of information load on the subjects. This complicated 
the purchase process and lowered their intention to use the testbed again. A cloud 
computing services vendor or broker can develop more sophisticated support tools as 
value-added services to support client decision-making for using cloud computing 
services. It can give simple support without too much effort from clients. This also 
may allow the broker, as a middleman, to extract additional information rent from the 
client. 
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Table 4.6 Two-sample t-test results of satisfaction instruments 
Instruments Mean Std.Dev p-value 
 Baseline 
Group 
Treatment 
Group 
  
Satisfaction 4.857 4.458 1.126 0.239 
Ease of use 3.810 4.125 1.462 0.473 
Intention to use again 5.810 5.000 1.154 0.025** 
Helpfulness of the risk analy-
sis support tool 
4.762 4.875 1.125 0.737 
Risk concern vs. Profit con-
cern 4.762 3.833 1.593 0.056* 
Note: For the instrument “Risk concern vs. Profit concern”, a larger number indicates that the 
subject was more concerned with minimizing risk than maximizing profit. *** p < 0.01, ** p 
< 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Recall that the results suggest that client willingness-to-pay for cloud computing 
services with guaranteed job completion under the compound pricing mechanism 
does not differ for job duration. It is possible that the difference in the levels of risk 
for spot-price services interruption for the three different duration jobs was not large 
enough for the subjects to have perceived meaningful differences. Alternatively, sub-
jects may have viewed the levels of risks of these different computing jobs to be a 
less critical driver of their valuation of compound cloud computing services with 
guaranteed job completion. 
4.5  Discussions and Implications 
In this study, I found evidence that subjects over-estimated the risk of services in-
terruption associated with spot-price services. As a result, they were willing to pay a 
higher price than actually was needed to eliminate the risk. This was more obvious 
when subjects were not provided with risk analysis support information. The prices 
offered to the hypothetical cloud services vendor were, on average, much higher than 
 91 
  
the expected spot prices for the same computing jobs. This result confirms prior find-
ings that consumers tend to over-estimate the probability of an undesirable outcome 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
My results show that risk-informedness affects client willingness-to-pay for bro-
kered cloud computing services with a job completion guarantee. This is managerially 
useful knowledge. My results also show that this effect, however, is moderated by the 
client’s risk aversion. This is interesting and also is consistent with findings in previ-
ous research. In particular, Slovic (1972b) found that there was a moderating effect of 
subjects’ intrinsic risk propensity on their biased estimation of an uncertain outcome 
without explicit consideration of the business problem. This study contributes empiri-
cal evidence of that finding in an IT services-related business setting. 
In addition, prior research has shown that clients’ aversion to risk is affected by 
environmental factors (Slovic 1972a). Although I controlled for environmental effects 
thoroughly in this experiment, it is possible and potentially interesting to extend the 
experiment to incorporate decision-making scenarios with different environmental 
settings. For example, subjects could be instructed to purchase cloud computing ser-
vices for different purposes other than simulation, and under different preference set-
tings, as well as different budget constraints. 
Traditional cost-based pricing is not value-maximizing, in view of the dynamics 
of IT services adoption, due to the high level of demand uncertainty (Paleologo 2004). 
To the spot-price services vendor, the results of this study suggest that providing ad-
ditional risk analysis support will reduce users’ perceived risk from services interrup-
tion and thus increase their valuation of spot-price services. This will also likely in-
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crease their usage of spot-price services. Cloud services vendors therefore may want 
to maintain or start to offer the spot-price services, meanwhile providing risk analysis 
support to clients. 
Cloud service brokerages are still in the early stage of development. From a cloud 
services broker’s perspective, providing risk analysis support may not be a desirable 
option though, because it will lower client willingness-to-pay for the brokered cloud 
services. However, when risk analysis support is not available, there is an opportunity 
for price discrimination based on client risk aversion.  
This study also provides a novel design for brokered cloud services. A services 
vendor can offer clients the opportunity to customize their uptime requirements, set 
compensation requirements, and yield the prices they are willing to pay to the vendor. 
The mechanism is not restricted to the customization of uptime requirements and a 
compensation scheme. It can also be extended to accommodate other features in the 
use of cloud computing services, such as service specifications, contract flexibility, 
and support.  
There is strong market potential for cloud brokers. Without the overhead of man-
aging and maintaining a large infrastructure and different software stacks, cloud bro-
kers will be able to focus on innovative ways of providing services, develop a highly 
customized portfolios of services, and maintain their customer relationships. In addi-
tion, cloud brokers will be able to aggregate demand and supply simultaneously, 
which creates opportunities for better and more complex resources allocation strate-
gies. 
 
 93 
  
4.6  Conclusion 
This research proposes a compound pricing mechanism for cloud computing ser-
vices with guaranteed job completion. I combined an analysis of the spot prices of 
Amazon EC2 with an experimental study to examine the impact of key variables on 
client willingness-to-pay for cloud computing services sold with this new mechanism. 
Risk informedness, risk aversion and their interaction affect a client’s willingness-to-
pay. In addition, the results are consistent for jobs involving low and high completion 
risk. 
The results suggest that increased risk informedness reduces a client’s uncertainty 
about the impacts of services interruption. However, this informedness effect is mod-
erated by a client’s aversion to risk. The greater the client’s risk aversion, the more 
influential will be the risk-related information. A limitation of the current experi-
mental design is that it does not yet reveal the effects of risk-informedness in terms of 
whether a client is more or less prone to adopt and benefit from the compound pricing 
mechanism. It may be attractive for a client who is risk-averse to use guaranteed job 
completion services to neutralize the risk that arises around job duration. On the other 
hand, additional risk information may mean that a client is informed well enough to 
directly assess whether there is business value to be achieved from paying for protec-
tion. Currently, there are no cloud computing services vendors who offer high levels 
of risk analysis support so clients will be informed in the way described here. This 
mechanism can also be extended to accommodate other innovations in service speci-
fications, contract flexibility and support services. 
This research has limitations. Participants were required to purchase computing 
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resources from a hypothetical cloud vendor. I did not measure participants’ actual 
willingness-to-pay, but instead only their hypothetical willingness-to-pay. This may 
cause hypothetical bias, which is defined in the economics literature as the bias in-
duced by the hypothetical nature of the tasks (Harrison and Rutstrom 2008). If the 
testbed used in this study was deployed in a real-world business setting, incentive-
aligned measurements of client willingness-to-pay will be obtained and the hypothet-
ical bias will be overcome. Furthermore, the current version of the testbed includes 
only two conditions that are different in their impacts on clients’ informedness about 
the interruption risk of the cloud services sold on this testbed. This, to a large extent, 
limits the usability and generality of the findings. Further development of the testbed 
will include the construction of a configurable module that allows modification of 
other desirable features related to the use of cloud services, such as whether there is 
protection against services interruption available, or whether a data migration tool is 
provided. 
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5  Institutional Review Board (IRB) Experience 
Because the cloud computing pricing experiment conducted in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation involves human subjects, prior to the conduct of this experiment, I ap-
plied for IRB approval, and gained some useful experience from the application pro-
cess. In this chapter, I will provide a brief introduction to IRB, how the application 
proceeds, the lessons learned, and the best practices. 
5.1  Introduction of IRB 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB), also known as Independent Ethics Com-
mittee or Ethical Review Board, is a committee that is dedicated to the reviewing, ap-
proving, and monitoring of research projects that involve human subjects. The major 
responsibility of the IRB is to protect the investigators and participants. Participants 
may be exposed to potential risks of harm because of seemingly normal actions, and 
an investigator may be unaware when this may occur. Furthermore, if the information 
that can identify a participant is required by the investigator, the participants’ privacy 
is at risk. Sensitive personal information also may be leaked by the investigator unin-
tentionally. This will cause some undesirable consequences on the investigator too.  
IRB committee members typically analyze the study that is being reviewed, and 
decide whether the study should be approved for execution. For experiments that may 
cause considerable risk to participants, IRB committee members will inspect its de-
velopment. According to the terms and reference of SMU’s IRB2, “The mission of the 
IRB is to protect the rights, privacy, and welfare of human subjects who participate in 
research. To accomplish this mission, the IRB will perform the primary functions of 
                                                 
2 More information about SMU IRB and IRB application can be found at 
http://research.smu.edu.sg/researchsmu/institutional-review-board 
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education, review, approval, and monitoring with regard to adherence to established 
criteria of ethical practices in research.” 
In general, IRB committee members need to make sure no sensitive personal in-
formation on the participants is collected by the investigator, unless it is absolutely 
necessary. In that case, they will make sure that sufficient effort is devoted, so the in-
formation is secure. IRB committee members will also examine each step of the ex-
periment to make sure participants are not exposed to risk without sufficient justifica-
tions.  
There are three categories of IRB applications: exempt from detailed review, ex-
pedited review, and full review3. IRB committee member will judge which category 
an application belongs to. Major criteria are whether participants’ sensitive personal 
information is collected, and whether participants are exposed to risk, including de-
ception, stress, and physical harm, etc. 
5.2  Replay of IRB Permission Process 
I submitted, revised, and re-submitted the IRB application for the user study 
“Cloud Computing Pricing Mechanisms” several times. (See Figure 5.1.) The IRB 
Committee members paid much attention to the details of the study and were very 
considerate. Detailed descriptions of the initial submission, revisions and issues raised 
by IRB reviewers are presented next. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Detailed description of the three categories and their inclusion criteria can be found at 
http://intranet.smu.edu.sg/or/IRB/instructions.asp (Need to login to SMU Intranet) 
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Figure 5.1 Timeline for IRB application submissions and revisions 
 
My initial submission was made on September 19, 2012. The issues were as fol-
lows: 
(1) How email addresses of participants would be obtained was not specified. 
This needed to be stated in detail, and also who would send out email and who 
would be approved for accessing the emails. 
(2) An estimate of the overall experiment duration, as well as separate estimates 
of durations of all experiment steps, should be made. In the initial submission, 
only an estimate of overall experiment duration was provided. 
(3) Whether participants needed to provide their personal information to claim 
compensation was not clearly specified. 
(4) One item in the application form was not completed. 
(5) An improper word was used in the informed consent form (“win”), and IRB 
suggested a correction (“gifts of appreciation”). 
(6) It was not clearly specified how participants’ personal information in the in-
formed consent form would be secured. 
(7) No proper statements that let participants declare they were above 18 years 
old were placed in the informed consent form. 
September 19, 2012 October 12, 2012 October 24, 2012 
Initial submit Revise and re-submit Revise and re-submit 
Approved Issues: 
• Bonus structure 
needs justification 
Issues: 
• Protection of sensitive information 
• Estimate of time to complete  
• Instruction wordings 
• Compulsory statements 
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(8) Contact details of the SMU IRB needed to be put in the informed consent 
form; they were excluded in the initial submission. 
(9) A checklist for submission of IRB application needed to be submitted together 
with the other documents.  
After receiving the comments, I carefully considered each question and revised 
the application forms accordingly. In this round of revision, I considered different 
ways of securing my subjects’ sensitive information. Finally, I chose to save the sen-
sitive data and other data separately. All the compulsory statements were available on 
IRB web site; some rewording is needed though. 
My second submission was made on October 12, 2012. Besides the base compen-
sation for participation, a bonus schedule was also introduced into the experiment. 
This is not a common component in this kind of study. I had not yet provided justifi-
cation for this arrangement. The IRB required clarification on whether this bonus 
structure represented amounts at or close to the minimum amounts that was thought 
to be necessary for testing the research question. The review indicated that the total 
compensation given to participants was probably too much, and that it would poten-
tially give participants an inappropriate incentive to join the experiment, and which 
were likely to compromise the results. So I visited the web portal of the Ministry of 
Manpower of Singapore to search for statistics of wages in different industries. The 
information that I found was used to prove that even the highest amount in the bonus 
structure was below the average wage level of the industry sector to which the partic-
ipants belonged. This suggested that the scheme was a reasonable arrangement. 
The third submission was on October 24, 2012, and was approved on October 29, 
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2012. All documents had to be submitted in hard copy and needed to be signed by 
both the primary investigator and the applicant. 
5.3  Lessons Learned from the IRB Application Procedure 
During the IRB application, I went through the whole experimental process more 
times than I expected. It encouraged me to keep asking questions about each step of 
the experiment: (1) is it necessary to answer the research question? (2) Will it cause 
any risk to the subjects? (3) How long will the experiment take, and will it be too time 
consuming? Through this process, I found that several steps actually could be 
dropped and some could be combined, thus simplifying the experimental procedure.  
In addition, the IRB application increased my awareness of the necessity of secur-
ing the subjects’ personal information. I also learned the importance of establishing a 
proper compensation scheme for participations. This led me to refine the incentive 
design. 
5.4  Best Practices 
Despite the kind help from the IRB staff and detailed instructions on how to de-
velop an application, there are still some issues to which an applicant should pay spe-
cial attention in order to improve the quality of the research and reduce the rounds of 
revisions. 
• Pay extra attention to the details. It’s always a good practice to prepare a 
checklist at the beginning of the application process, when you start to prepare 
the related documents. Besides the official checklist that identifies all of the 
documents that are to be submitted, it’s helpful to list the key components in 
the experiment design too. That will include: (1) a clearly written statement on 
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the motivation and contribution of the research; (2) a deception of reasonable 
compensation scheme; (3) a description of the steps that involve collection of 
subjects’ personal information and how the information will be secured; (4) 
estimation of the time a subject will spend in each step of the experiment, and 
an estimate of the time to be spent for the whole experiment; (5) IRB contact 
details in the informed consent form; (6) a proper statement in the informed 
consent form that requires participants to declare they are above 18 years old; 
and (7) a statement that helps participants to be aware of the fact that they are 
participating the experiment voluntarily and that they are free to discontinue 
participation anytime without penalty.  
• Design an effective incentive scheme. It’s very important to properly motivate 
subjects to participate. The background and research questions of the study 
should be conveyed to potential participants in a clear way. Highlighting their 
contributions in plain English will be helpful in attracting potential partici-
pants who will be interested in the research. Compensation should be set up 
properly too. It should be no higher than the average hourly wage level of the 
targeted subject group times the estimated duration of the whole experiment in 
hours. It is a token to show the experimenter’s appreciation to the participants 
for spending their time and energy contributing to the study. But it’s not 
meant to be a way to incentivize subjects to participate in the experiment.  
• Try not to store sensitive personal information. I am referring to sensitive per-
sonal information addresses that can potentially identify a specific person, 
such as an email address with real names, or a passport number. Think twice 
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while designing the experimental study about whether it’s a necessity to col-
lect such information. If the information is used just to identify subjects in or-
der to give them compensation, then masking identifiers, such as a sequence 
of randomly generated integers, can be used instead. If it’s necessary to collect 
sensitive personal information, store this information and other experimental 
data separately and with security treatments such as data encryption. 
• Give simple, clear, and correct instructions. Subjects commonly are required 
to read and follow instructions to complete an experiment. The instructions 
should be correct and clear. Using accurate descriptions and eliminating am-
biguous ones are important.  
• Double check the experimental procedures for potential deception and risk. 
Subjects commonly are required to perform some tasks during the experi-
mental procedures. The experimental tasks, procedures, as well as instruction, 
should not introduce any deception to subjects. All steps should be carefully 
examined to ensure that they are necessary to seeking answers to the research 
questions, and won’t cause potential physical or mental damage to subjects.  
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6  Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the macro-structure of pricing practices in the 
cloud computing services market. I conducted a market survey of pricing mechanisms 
implemented by representative cloud computing services vendors. Based on the in-
formation I extracted the structure of price-related attributes, and created a framework 
of pricing models for cloud computing services. The following two chapters adopted 
micro-level perspectives to study pricing in the cloud computing services market. One 
takes the vendor’s point of view and the other takes the client’s perspective.  
Chapter 2 explored in detail the pricing schema of 27 cloud computing services 
from 19 representative cloud services vendors. I found the commonly adopted usage 
based pricing is decided not only by the metered usage, but also by whether a client 
needs to be assured of access to the services, how much the client would expect if the 
services were down for a certain period of time, and how much support the client 
needed from the cloud services vendor. I also found the cost of using cloud compu-
ting services decreased along time, with frequent price reductions announced by 
cloud services vendors. In addition, clients have more flexibility in choosing their 
ideal combination of cloud resources to come up with a configuration that serve their 
needs best. This is enabled by cloud services vendors’ effort to make their services 
offerings configurable, and prices for customized configurations instantly shown.  
Chapter 3 investigated a cloud vendors’ pricing strategy in the presence of fixed-
price reserved services and spot-price on-demand services. Hybrid pricing strategy, 
involving both fixed-prices and spot-prices, is preferable for a cloud services vendor 
with market power, when clients are sensitive to services interruption or a lower qual-
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ity version of the cloud services yields reasonably high profit for the vendor. The in-
terplay between services offered with the two pricing methods and their impacts on 
vendor profit and client welfare is also discussed. By introducing spot-price inter-
ruptible services of lower quality, the vendor gains a higher profit, while the clients’ 
welfare decreases. 
Chapter 4 takes the client perspective to investigate factors affecting their will-
ingness-to-pay for brokered cloud computing services that permit some level of cus-
tomization. Specifically, the customization of cloud computing services that I consid-
er is related to the level of risk of services interruption. I did experimental work in-
volving hypothetical cloud computing services clients, with two design variables: 
risk-informedness and task duration. Task duration is a proxy for the level of risk for 
a task to be executed using spot-price cloud services. The results indicated a signifi-
cant effect of risk infromedness on client willingness-to-pay. They also suggested an 
interaction effect between risk informedness and client risk aversion. So it is im-
portant for vendors to gain knowledge about their clients’ risk aversion to achieve 
higher profit. Without such knowledge, vendors will not be able to implement pricing 
plans that allow clients to self-select according to their risk aversion.  
The studies in this thesis research have limitations. For the analytic model, spot 
prices are assumed to be exogenous. A more general setting should consider a ven-
dor’s decision on spot prices together with its decision on the fixed price of reserved 
services. In addition, I assumed that clients’ demands are invariant across all periods, 
which is not realistic. Furthermore, the pricing experiment did not involve partici-
pants that were participating in the real-world cloud computing business. The experi-
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mental study can be well extended to include subjects who are in real cloud business-
es.  
My future research will include a relaxation of the i.i.d. assumption in the analytic 
model that addresses cloud computing pricing strategy. I also plan to relax the exoge-
nous spot price level assumption, and mimic the real Amazon EC2 market with a 
simulation approach. I have refinement of the testbed for more configurable cloud 
pricing experiment settings in progress. The risk analysis approach also needs im-
provement, in order to permit predictive analysis support that is a desirable feature of 
clients. The pricing model will also support the comparison of services that are of-
fered by direct competitors. I will also extend the pricing model to include the con-
sideration on how price signals quality and resource capacity of cloud computing ser-
vices, and provide predictions related to future shifts in services specifications and 
pricing approaches. 
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Appendix A1. Pricing Detail of IaaS Cloud Services 
 Factor Group I: Usage-based Pricing Factor Group II: Reserva-
tion-based Pricing 
Factor Group  III: Support-
related Pricing 
Factor Group IV: Penalties 
Services Speci-
fications 
Unit Price Total 
Usage 
Reserva-
tion Period 
On-time Pay-
ment 
Support Ser-
vices Specifi-
cation 
Unit Price Services Down Time Penalty Rate 
Amazon 
EC2 
a. On-
Demand 
Instance 
- OS (Linux or 
Windows),  
- size of in-
stances (small, 
large, extra 
large),  
-location of 
server (US, 
Europe, Asia) 
Varies with services 
specifications, for ex-
ample, $0.085 /hour 
for Linux, Small, US-
N.V. 
[0, Up-
per 
Bound*] 
NA NA Bronze/Silver/
Gold/Platinum 
Response with-
in 15 minutes 
to12 hours 
Varies with 
services speci-
fications and 
usage charge, 
for example, 
for Platinum 
Support, Cost 
will be the 
greater of 
$15K or 10% 
of monthly 
usage charge 
Annual uptime for the 
services is fixed at 
99.95% 
Response time guar-
antee for support ser-
vices 
A 10% ser-
vice credit if 
the services 
uptime not 
met 
Amazon 
EC2  
b. Re-
served 
Instances 
Varies with services 
specifications, for ex-
ample, $0.03 /hour for 
an instance (Linux, 
Small, US-N.V). 
1 year/3 
years 
Varies with 
services speci-
fication and 
reservation 
period, for ex-
ample, $227.5 
for 1 year res-
ervation of a 
Linux, Small, 
US-N.V. in-
stance. 
Amazon 
EC2  
c. Spot 
Instances 
Varies with services 
specifications, for ex-
ample, $0.031 /hour 
for Linux, Small, US-
N.V. 
[0, 
Availa-
ble Re-
source*] 
NA NA 
Amazon 
S3 
99.999999999% 
Durability / 
99.99% Dura-
bility 
Varies with services 
specifications, for ex-
ample, $0.14/ GB, 
$0.01 per 1000 re-
quests 
[0, Up-
per 
Bound*] 
NA NA Monthly uptime of 
99.9% for the services 
Response time guar-
antee for supported 
services 
A 10%-25% 
service cred-
it if services 
uptime not 
met 
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Appendix A1. Pricing Detail of IaaS Cloud Services (Cont.d) 
 Factor Group I: Usage-based Pricing Factor Group II: Reservation-
based Pricing 
Factor Group  III: Support-
related Pricing 
Factor Group IV: Penalties 
Services 
Specifications 
Unit Price Total Us-
age 
Reservation 
Period 
On-time Pay-
ment 
Support Ser-
vices Specifica-
tion 
Unit Price Services Down 
Time 
Penalty Rate 
Alatum  -Compute 
-ValuePlus 
-Power 
-PowerPlus 
-Customized 
Varies with ser-
vices specifica-
tions, for exam-
ple, 
S$479.70/month 
for Value Com-
pute 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
1 year Info not availa-
ble 
Info not availa-
ble 
Info not 
available 
Info not available Info not avail-
able 
nGrid  Compute S$1.00/hour [0, Upper 
Bound*] 
1 month (pack-
age) 
S$850 Info not availa-
ble 
Info not 
available 
Info not available Info not avail-
able 
CloudSigma -RAM 
-Cores 
-Storage 
Varies with the 
services specifi-
cations, for ex-
ample, 
S$72.37/month 
for an instance 
with 1 Core, 
2GB memory, 
and 80GB SSD 
storage 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
1 month up to 3 
years 
Based on ser-
vices specifica-
tions.  
Info not availa-
ble 
Info not 
available 
A 100% uptime 
guarantee for the 
services 
Credit of 50 
times the fees 
for any period: 
(1) virtual 
server una-
vailable; or (2) 
network una-
vailable for 
more than 15 
minutes 
GoGrid 
Cloud Serv-
ers 
-RAM 
-Cores 
-Storage 
Varies with ser-
vices specifica-
tions, for exam-
ple, $0.04/hour 
for an X-Small 
instance 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
-Monthly 
-Semiannually 
-Annually 
Varies with ser-
vices specifica-
tions, for exam-
ple, 
$18.13/month 
for an X-Small 
instance 
Free 24/7 tech 
support 
Free A 100% uptime 
guarantee for the 
services 
A 30 mins emer-
gency response 
time for support 
services 
10000% Ser-
vice Credit if 
uptime not met 
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Appendix A1. Pricing Detail of IaaS Cloud Services (Cont.d) 
 Factor Group I: Usage-based Pricing Factor Group II: 
Reservation-based 
Pricing 
Factor Group  III: Support-
related Pricing 
Factor Group IV: Penalties 
Services Spec-
ifications 
Unit Price Total 
Usage 
Reserva-
tion Period 
On-time 
Payment 
Support Services 
Specification 
Unit Price Services 
Down Time 
Penalty Rate 
Joyent 
Cloud 
-RAM 
-Cores 
-Storage 
Varies with services 
specifications, for 
example, S$0.04/hour 
for an Extra Small 
instance 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
NA NA -Bronze 
-Gold 
-Platinum 
Free, but de-
pends on the 
consumption 
levels. 
A 100% 
availability 
for the ser-
vices 
5% of the monthly fee 
for each 30 minutes of 
downtime (up to 100% 
of customer's monthly 
fee for the affected serv-
er) 
RackSpace 
Cloud 
Server 
-RAM 
-vCPU 
-Storage 
-Network 
-OS 
Varies with services 
specifications, for 
example, $0.08/hour 
for an instance with 1 
vCPU, 1GB RAM, 
40GB disk space, 
30Mbps public net-
work, 60Mbps inter-
nal network 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
NA NA -Managed Cloud 
-Cloud Account 
Different sup-
port compo-
nents based 
on clients’ 
account types 
A 100% up-
time guaran-
tee for the 
services 
5% of the monthly fee 
for each 30 minutes of 
downtime (up to 100% 
of the cloud server fees) 
FlexiScale -RAM  
-vCPU 
-Storage 
-Network 
-OS 
Varies with services 
specifications, 
charged with virtual 
credits (purchased 
with cash) 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
NA NA -Phone support 
-Online Customer 
Support Ticket or 
email 
-24x7 Emergency 
helpline 
Free A 100% 
monthly up-
time guaran-
tee for the 
services 
Credit 5% of the month-
ly services units for each 
additional 30 minutes of 
downtime that occur, up 
to 100% of the monthly 
services units consumed. 
Profit 
Bricks 
IaaS 
-RAM 
-Core 
-Storage 
-Traffic 
Varies with services 
specifications, for 
example, $6¢/hour for 
1 Core (=4 CPUs) 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
NA NA 24/7 phone sup-
port 
Free A 99.95% 
annual uptime 
guarantee for 
the services 
NA 
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Appendix A1. Pricing Detail of IaaS Cloud Services (Cont.d) 
 Factor Group I: Usage-based Pricing Factor Group II: Reserva-
tion-based Pricing 
Factor Group  III: Support-related 
Pricing 
Factor Group IV: Penalties 
Services 
Specifications 
Unit Price Total 
Usage 
Reservation 
Period 
On-time 
Payment 
Support Services 
Specification 
Unit Price Services 
Down Time 
Penalty Rate 
Google 
Compute 
Engine 
-Core 
-Memory 
-Storage 
Varies with services 
specifications, for 
example, S$0.17/hour 
for a n1-standard-1d 
instance 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
NA NA -Community sup-
port 
-Bronze 
-Silver 
-Gold 
-Platinum Sup-
port 
Varies with 
support ser-
vices specifi-
cations, for 
example, 
Bronze is free, 
Silver costs 
$150 per 
month 
A 99.95% 
monthly up-
time guaran-
tee for the 
services 
-10% of monthly 
bill as service credit 
for 99.00%-99.95%  
-25% credit for 
95.00% - < 99.00%  
-50% credit for be-
low 95.00%  
HP Public 
Cloud 
(Cloud 
Compute) 
-OS (Linux, 
Windows) 
-size of com-
pute instanc-
es: extra 
small, small, 
medium, 
large, extra 
large, double 
extra large 
Varies with services 
specifications, for 
example, S$0.04/hour 
for an extra small 
instance with 1 HP 
Cloud Compute Unit 
(1 virtual core w/1 HP 
Cloud Compute Unit), 
1GB RAM, 30GB 
storage 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
Month Varies with 
services spec-
ifications, and 
number of 
instances 
-Community fo-
rums 
-Customer 
knowledge base 
-Support case 
management page 
-Live support-
chat, email, and 
phone 
-Status page 
Free A 99.95% 
monthly 
availability 
guarantee for 
the services 
-5% of monthly bill 
as service credit for 
99.9% to 99.95%  
-10% credit for 
99.5% to 99.9%  
-20% credit for 99% 
to 99.5% for 
-30% credit for be-
low 99.0% 
CloudLayer 
Computing 
Core, Ram, 
Storage, Out-
bound traffic 
(Inbound 
traffic free) 
Varies with services 
specifications, for 
example, S$0.10/hour 
for an instance with 1 
Core, 1GB RAM, 
25GB storage 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
Month Varies with 
services spec-
ifications, and 
number of 
instances 
-Web 
-Phone support 
-Ticket system 
support 
Free 100% net-
work uptime 
guarantee, 20 
minutes re-
sponse on all 
tickets 
service credit of 5% 
of the fees for the 
relevant service for 
every 30 continuous 
minutes outage pe-
riod 
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Appendix A2. Pricing Detail of PaaS Cloud Services  
 Factor Group I: Usage-based Pricing Factor Group II: Reservation-
based Pricing 
Factor Group  III: Support-related 
Pricing 
Factor Group IV: Penalties 
Services Speci-
fications 
Unit Price Total 
Usage 
Reservation 
Period 
On-time Payment Support Services 
Specification 
Unit Price Services Down 
Time 
Penalty Rate 
Microsoft 
a. Win-
dows Az-
ure 
-OS 
-Size of in-
stances (small, 
large, extra 
large) 
-Location (US, 
Europe, Asia) 
Varies with 
services speci-
fications, for 
example, 
S$0.06/hour 
for an extra 
small instance 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
1 month Varies with ser-
vices specifica-
tions, for example, 
S$90.35/month  
-Foundation 
-Standard 
-Plus 
-Ultimate 
 
Varies with 
support ser-
vices specifica-
tions 
A 99.95% monthly 
uptime guarantee 
for services 
A 1 hour response 
time guarantee for 
support services 
A 10%-25% 
service credit  
if uptime not 
met 
 
Microsoft 
b. SQL 
Azure 
-Web edition 
-Business edi-
tion 
Varies with 
services speci-
fications, for 
example, 
S$12.54/month 
for one Web 
Edition data-
base up to 1GB 
1 month Varies with ser-
vices specifica-
tions, for example, 
S$100.40/month 
for a base Busi-
ness Edition unit 
A 99.9%  
monthly uptime 
guarantee for the 
services 
A 1 hour response 
time guarantee for 
support services 
Force.com -One App 
-Enterprise 
-Unlimited 
Info not avail-
able 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
1 month Varies with ser-
vice specifications, 
for example, 
S$18.83/month for 
One App edition 
of one user  
-Standard 
-Premier 
-Premier+ 
 
Price depends 
on subscription 
type and 
monthly fee. 
A 2 hours or 2 
business days re-
sponse time guar-
antee for the sup-
port services 
NA 
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Appendix A2. Pricing Detail of PaaS Cloud Services (Cont.d) 
 Factor Group I: Usage-based Pricing Factor Group II: Reserva-
tion-based Pricing 
Factor Group  III: Support-
related Pricing 
Factor Group IV: Penalties 
Services Specifi-
cations 
Unit Price Total Us-
age 
Reserva-
tion Peri-
od 
On-time Pay-
ment 
Support Services 
Specification 
Unit Price Services Down 
Time 
Penalty Rate 
Google 
App En-
gine 
Standard S$11.30/app 
S$627.55/acc
ount 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
  -Community 
Support 
-Operational 
Support 
-Premium Devel-
oper Support 
 A 99.95%  
monthly uptime 
guarantee for 
the services 
A 1 to 8 busi-
ness hours re-
sponse time 
guarantee for 
the support ser-
vices 
A 10%-50% 
monthly service 
credit  if uptime 
not met  
 
Amazon 
Beanstalk 
No additional 
charge besides 
charges for EC2 
instances 
NA [0, Upper 
Bound*] 
NA NA NA NA NA NA 
CloudFare -Free 
-Pro 
-Business 
-Enterprise 
NA [0, Upper 
Bound*] 
1 month Varies with 
services speci-
fications, for 
example, 
S$251.02/mont
h for each site 
under Business 
plan 
-Email 
-Phone support 
-Dedicated ac-
count manager 
Free, option 
availability 
depends on 
the plan 
A 100% uptime 
guarantee for 
Business and 
Enterprise plans 
Service Credit = 
(Outage Period 
minutes * Af-
fected Customer 
Ratio) ÷ Sched-
uled Availabil-
ity minutes 
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Appendix A3. Pricing Detail of SaaS Cloud Services  
 Factor Group I: Usage-based Pricing Factor Group II: Reservation-based 
Pricing 
Factor Group  III: Support-related 
Pricing 
Factor Group IV: Pen-
alties 
Services Specifica-
tions 
Unit Price Total Usage Reservation 
Period 
On-time Payment Support Ser-
vices Specifi-
cation 
Unit Price Services 
Down Time 
Penalty 
Rate 
SalesForc
e 
a. Service 
Cloud 
-Professional 
-Enterprise 
-Unlimited 
Information 
not available 
 
[0, Upper 
Bound*] 
1 month Varies with services 
specifications, for exam-
ple,  
S$81.58/user/month for 
Professional Edition 
-Standard 
-Premier 
-Premier+ 
Standard Support is 
included in all ser-
vice packages. 
Premier: 15% of 
license price for 
Professional and 
Enterprise Editions. 
Premier+: Included 
with Unlimited 
Edition. Or 25% of 
license price for 
Professional and 
Enterprise Editions. 
A 2 hours or 
2 business 
days re-
sponse time 
guarantee for 
the support 
services 
Infor-
mation 
not 
availa-
ble 
SalesForc
e 
b. Sales 
Cloud 
-Contact Manager 
-Group 
-Professional 
-Enterprise 
-Unlimited 
Varies with services 
specifications, for exam-
ple,  
S$18.83/user/month for 
Group Edition 
SalesForc
e 
c. Chatter 
-Chatter(free) 
-Chatter Plus 
Varies with services 
specifications, for exam-
ple,  
S$18.83/user/month for 
Chatter Plus 
SalesForc
e 
c. Jigsaw 
-Jigsaw Clean 
-Jigsaw 
-Jigsaw Lists 
Varies with services 
specifications, for exam-
ple,  
S$23.85 /user/month for 
Jigsaw Clean 
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Appendix A3. Pricing Detail of SaaS Cloud Services (Cont.d) 
 Factor Group I: Usage-based 
Pricing 
Factor Group II: Reservation-
based Pricing 
Factor Group  III: Support-related Pricing Factor Group IV: Penalties 
Services 
Specifica-
tions 
Unit 
Price 
Total 
Usage 
Reser-
vation 
Period 
On-time Payment Support Services 
Specification 
Unit Price Services 
Down Time 
Penalty Rate 
Google App 
for Business 
-Flexible 
plan 
-Annual plan 
NA [0, Up-
per 
Bound*] 
month / 
year 
S$6.28/user ac-
count/month 
S$62.76/user ac-
count/year 
-Standard 
-Premium 
Information not 
available 
A 99.9% 
monthly up-
time guaran-
tee for the 
services 
A 1 hour to 1 
business day 
response time 
guarantee for 
the support 
services 
3-15 days free use 
if services uptime 
not met 
NetSuite 
Cloud ERP 
Software Suite 
Various 
packages and 
plans for 
different 
software 
applications 
NA  [0, Up-
per 
Bound*] 
month Varies with services 
specifications, and 
number of users, for 
example, 
S$123.9/month for Net-
Suite Small Business 
-NetCARE Silver 
-Gold 
-Gold 24/7 
-Platinum 
-Silver: 22.5% of 
net license amount 
-Gold: 27.5% of net 
license amount 
-Gold 24/7: 32.5% 
of net license 
amount 
-Platinum: 37.5% of 
net license amount 
A 99.5% up-
time guaran-
tee for the 
services 
Information not 
available 
Microsoft Of-
fice 365 
-For Home 
-For Small 
Business 
-For Midsize 
Business 
NA [0, Up-
per 
Bound*] 
month / 
year 
Varies with services 
specifications, number 
of concurrent users, and 
number of by-service 
components 
Varies with services 
specifications (blog, 
wiki, QA, phone, 
direct technical staff 
phone contact, etc.) 
Free Varies with 
services speci-
fications 
NA 
 126 
  
Appendix A4. Pricing Detail of Cloud Brokerage Services 
 Factor Group I: Usage-based Pricing Factor Group II: Reserva-
tion-based Pricing 
Factor Group  III: Support-
related Pricing 
Factor Group IV: Penalties 
Services Specifications Unit Price Total 
Usage 
Reserva-
tion Period 
On-time 
Payment 
Support Ser-
vices Speci-
fication 
Unit Price Services Down 
Time 
Penalty 
Rate 
RightScale 
Cloud 
computing 
-Editions: 
-Free 
-Standard 
-Premium 
-Corporate 
-Enterprise 
Solution Packs: 
Development and 
Test/Grid/Zend PHP 
HA/Social Gaming 
Varies with services 
specifications, for 
example, 
S$1,255.10/month 
(initial fee 
S$5,020.40) for Pre-
mium Edition 
[0, Up-
per 
Bound*
] 
1 month Varies with 
services spec-
ifications, for 
example, 
S$627.55 + 
S$3,137.75 
(initial fee for 
5 customers) 
for Standard 
Edition 
-Community 
-Bronze 
-Silver 
-Gold 
-Platinum 
Included in solu-
tion charge 
A 4 business 
hours to 3 busi-
ness days re-
sponse time 
guarantee for 
the support ser-
vices 
Infor-
mation not 
available 
Boomi -Base 
-Professional 
-Enterprise 
Varies with services 
specifications, for 
example, S$313.78 
for extra connection 
for Standard Edition 
[0, Up-
per 
Bound*
] 
1 month Varies with 
services spec-
ifications, for 
example, 
S$690.31/mo
nth for Base 
edition 
-Standard 
-Premier 
Response: 1 
to 2 business 
days 
-Standard Sup-
port is included 
in editions 
-Price for Prem-
ier depends on 
monthly sub-
scription fee 
A 99.99% 
monthly uptime 
guarantee for 
the services 
A 1 t 2 business 
days response 
time guarantee 
for the support 
services 
A 10%-
100% ser-
vice credit 
if uptime 
not met 
PiCloud Computation Varies with services 
specifications, for 
example, S$0.06/hour 
for c1-default in-
stance 
[0, Up-
per 
Bound*
] 
NA NA -Basic 
-Silver 
-Gold 
-Basic: Free 
-Silver: $50 
-Gold: Greater of 
$300 or 10% of 
monthly usage 
A 99.9% annu-
ally uptime 
guarantee for 
the services 
A 10% 
service 
credit if 
uptime not 
met 
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Appendix B. Proofs for Lemmas and Propositions 
Proof of Lemma 1 
It can be proved by comparing the expected utility a client gets from using fixed-
price reserved services with unlimited resource capacity and that from using the same 
services with limited resource capacity. 
Proof of Reserved Pricing Strategy Proposition (P1) 
Vendor will maximize its profit, given by πReserved = (1 - F(𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ ))⋅PReserved. 
Plug in F(𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗ ) = 𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  / Λ, and 𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  = PReserved / ?̅?, it can be solved that 
optimal price of reserved services contract is 𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  = ?̅?Λ / 2.  
Proof of Spot Pricing Strategy Proposition (P2) 
Consider the bounded constraint 𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐿 ≥
𝛾 𝑅𝐿(1+𝛾) 𝑅𝐿−𝑃𝐿. Vendor’s profit from spot-
price services is πSpot = (𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐿2 + 𝑃𝐻𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐻) ⋅ 𝛬2, which is no smaller than �𝑃𝐻 −
𝑃𝐻
2
4𝑃𝐿
� ⋅
𝛬
2
. Rewriting the profit function we get 𝜋𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 = (𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐿2 − 𝑃𝐻𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐿 + 𝑃𝐻) ⋅ 𝛬2. 
Solve it we get vendor’s optimal choice of ProbL.  
Proof of Corollary 1 
The condition 𝑃𝐻 ≥ 𝑃𝐿 �1 + 𝛾 𝑅𝐿(1+𝛾) 𝑅𝐿−𝑃𝐿� is equivalent to 𝑃𝐻�(1 + 𝛾) 𝑣𝐿 − 𝑃𝐿� ≥
𝑃𝐿�(1 + 2𝛾) 𝑣𝐿 − 𝑃𝐿�, which is equivalent to 𝑃𝐻�(1 + 𝛾) 𝑣𝐿 − 𝑃𝐿�(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑃𝐿) ≥
𝑃𝐿�(1 + 2𝛾) 𝑣𝐿 − 𝑃𝐿�(𝑣𝐿 − 𝑃𝐿). Expanding the inequality we get 𝑣𝐿2𝑃𝐻(1 + 𝛾) −
𝑣𝐿(2 + 𝛾)𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐻 + 𝑃𝐻𝑃𝐿2 ≥ 𝑣𝐿2𝑃𝐿(2𝛾 + 1) − 𝑣𝐿(2 + 2𝛾)𝑃𝐿2 + 𝑃𝐿3. Expanding the term 
�𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐿
∗2 + 𝑃𝐻(1 − 𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐿∗)� 𝛬2 yields 𝑅𝐿2�𝑃𝐿𝛾2+𝑃𝐻(1+𝛾)�−𝑅𝐿(2+𝛾)𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐻+𝑃𝐻𝑃𝐿2�(1+𝛾) 𝑅𝐿−𝑃𝐿�2 ⋅ 𝛬2, and 
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plugging this term in to the condition just derived, further give 
𝑅𝐿
2�𝑃𝐿𝛾2+𝑃𝐻(1+𝛾)�−𝑅𝐿(2+𝛾) 𝑃𝐿𝑃𝐻+𝑃𝐻𝑃𝐿2
�(1+𝛾) 𝑅𝐿−𝑃𝐿�2 ⋅ 𝛬2 ≥ 𝑅𝐿2�𝑃𝐿𝛾2+𝑃𝐿(2𝛾+1)�−𝑅𝐿(2+2𝛾)𝑃𝐿2+𝑃𝐿3�(1+𝛾) 𝑅𝐿−𝑃𝐿�2 ⋅ 𝛬2 = 𝑃𝐿𝛬2 . 
Therefore the profit in Condition (1) is greater than or equal to that in Condition (2). 
Proof of Hybrid Pricing Strategy Proposition (P3) 
The vendor’s profit with a hybrid pricing strategy is πHybrid = �1 − 𝐹�𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗ �� 
PReserved + 𝐹�𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗ �⋅𝐸�𝜆|𝜆 < 𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗ �𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 = �1 − 2𝑅�−𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡2𝑅�2𝛬 𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅�𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅. 
Taking 2𝑅
�−𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡
2𝑅�2𝛬
 out of the equation yields πHybrid = 
2𝑅�−𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡
2𝑅�2𝛬
�
2𝑅�2𝛬
2𝑅�−𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡
− 𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅� 𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅. This is a linear transformation of the same 
problem the vendor faces when it maximizes profit for fixed-price reserved cloud 
computing services. (See Proof of the Reserved Pricing Strategy Proposition.) 
Proof of Impact of Spot-Price On-Demand Services Proposition (P4) 
Subtracting 𝜋𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑅𝐻𝑅∗  by 𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅∗  gives 𝛥𝜋 = 𝛬2 � 𝑅�22𝑅�−𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 − 𝑅�2�. The term (1 +
𝛾)𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐻 is bounded in �0, 1+𝛾4 �. So, the profit difference Δπ will be positive if 
the condition 𝑃
�𝑆
𝑅�
> 4(1+𝛾)𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐻(1−(1+𝛾)𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐻)
4(1+𝛾)𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐻−1+�8(1+𝛾)𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐻+1 holds. The right hand side 
is bounded in � (1+𝛾)(3−𝛾)
4�𝛾+�2𝛾+3�
, 1
2
�. Since (1+𝛾)(3−𝛾)
4�𝛾+�2𝛾+3�
 is in � √5−1
4
, √3
4
�, as long as 𝑃
�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡
𝑅�
> 1
2
, 
the profit difference Δ𝜋 will be positive. That means 𝑃
�𝑆
𝑅�
> 1
2
 is a sufficient condition 
under which hybrid pricing improves the vendor’s profit. 
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Proof of Impact of Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare Proposition (P5) 
Consumer surplus in the hybrid pricing case is CSHybrid = 
𝑅�𝛬
2
�1 − 𝑅�2�3𝑅�−2𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡�
𝑅��2𝑅�−𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡�
2 �. 
Let ΔCS be the difference between CSHybrid and CSReserved (CSHybrid - CSReserved). Then 
ΔCS = 𝑅�𝛬
2
�
3
4
−
𝑅�2�3𝑅�−2𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡�
𝑅��2𝑅�−𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡�
2 �. The term 
𝑅�2�3𝑅�−2𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡�
𝑅��2𝑅�−𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡�
2  can be transformed to (1 +
 γ)𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐻 (( (1 + γ)𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐻
2(1 + γ)𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝑅𝑜𝐻𝐻+𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑣� − 12)2 + 34) + 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑅�    , which is smaller than (1 +  γ)𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐻 + 𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑅� . Since the first term (1 +  γ)𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐿𝑃𝐻𝑜𝐻𝐻 is in �0, 1+𝛾4 �, 
by plugging in its maximal to Δ, then plugging in Δ to ΔCS, I conclude that when γ < 
(1/2 - 2𝑃�𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡/?̅?), using hybrid pricing will increase consumer surplus. 
Appendix C. Companions of the Experimental Study 
Appendix C1. Analysis of the Influence of Job Duration on Spot-Price Services 
Performance 
I began by analyzing the changes in spot price to obtain insights on services inter-
ruption risk. For spot-price data from Amazon for c1.xlarge instances in Western Eu-
rope from January 31, 2012 to January 31, 2013, I observed 1,195 price changes. The 
changes occurred any hour of the day. I simulated computing jobs with durations of 
up to 24 hours running on spot-price services to estimate the interruption risk associ-
ated with different job durations. Jobs of different types arrived randomly every hour 
during the days of the year, for a total of 8,760 jobs. (See Figures C1-1 and C1-2.) 
I will formally describe the simulation in this paragraph. I did the simulations 
based on real prices from Amazon EC2 Spot market between January 31 8:00:00 AM, 
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2012 and January 31 8:00:00 AM, 2013. For each simulation, I fixed the duration of 
jobs, which can be 1 to 24 hours. I further assumed that in each clock hour only one 
job would arrive and immediately start running with spot-price services. The jobs 
would arrive at different time point in the clock hour though, controlled by a random 
number uniformly distributed in [0, 59] representing the minutes passed when a job 
arrived since the start of the clock hour. Therefore, each simulation contained 8760 
jobs in total. The simulation agent was programmed to record for each job ran with 
spot-price services whether it completed in the end. The probability of services inter-
ruption for the job with fixed duration was then calculated as percentage of the 8760 
job executions that were interrupted. 
In addition, the simulation agent was programmed to also calculate and collect the 
percentage of completion of jobs that were interrupted, and the payment for each job 
ran with spot-price services. I in the end aggregated the results for all of the jobs and 
derived related statistics for the risk analysis. This process was repeated for the three 
experimental jobs with durations of 3, 5, and 10 hours. 
The analysis results suggest that the longer the duration of a computing job, the 
higher the risk of services interruption. Though interruption can occur for job with 
any duration, overall job interruption is infrequent. For example, only 0.7% of all 
three-hour computing jobs running with spot-price services were interrupted due to 
price changes. 
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Figure C1-1. Spot-price changes at dif-
ferent clock times in the study period 
Figure C1-2. Interruption risk for 
computing jobs with 1 to 24 hour 
durations 
# of Spot-Price Changes in the Market 
 
Clock Hours 
Likelihood of Job Interruption 
 
Job Duration 
My other ongoing field study of current spot-prices for cloud computing services 
suggests that job-risk analysis support is not available to clients from the vendors. 
Amazon.com provides real-time and historical prices for each type of computing in-
stance it offers, only by region and computing capacity though. The historical price 
information gives clients a sense of the frequency of price changes but does not offer 
additional information to help clients to quantify the associated interruption risk for 
their jobs. (See Figure C1-3.) 
The analysis suggests that: (1) due to unpredictable spot market price changes, 
every computing job run on spot-price services is subject to interruption risk; (2) 
computing jobs of longer duration bear a higher risk; and (3) clients do not have 
much risk analysis support from vendors. 
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Figure C1-3. Amazon.com’s EC2 Management Console 
 
Appendix C2. Risk Propensity Measurement (Adopted from Weber 2002) 
For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you 
would engage in the described activity or behavior, if you were to find yourself in that 
situation. In addition, for each of the statements, please indicate how risky you per-
ceive each situation to be. Provide a rating from 1 to 5 on the likelihood that you 
would engage in the described activity or behavior: very unlikely to neutral to very 
likely; how risky you perceive each situation to be: not at all – moderate – extremely 
risky -- 
1. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. 
2. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. 
3. Betting a day of your annual income at a high-stakes poker game. 
4. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. 
5. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event. 
6. Investing 5% of your annual income in a dependable and conservative stock. 
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7. Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture. 
8. Gambling a week’s income at a casino. 
 
